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TOWARD A COLORBLIND JURY SELECTION
PROCESS: APPLYING THE "BATSON FUNCTION"
TO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN CIVIL TRIALS
Lee Goldman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Jews are cheap. Afro-Americans are poor and ignorant.
Catholics are authoritarian and unforgiving. These generalizations are acceptable only in All in the Family reruns and
many civil trials in the United States.
In Batson v. Kentucky,' the United States Supreme Court
prohibited the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
in criminal trials. The Court, however, has never addressed
whether its holding should extend to civil hearings. Lower
courts that have faced the issue have reached differing conclusions.2 Commentators' views have been equally disparate.'
© 1990 by Lee Goldman.
*

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Nation-

al Law Center; B.A. 1976 Queens College; J.D. 1979 Stanford University.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. Compare Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp.
760 (D. Conn. 1986); McDaniel v. Mutchnick, WD 41498 (Mo.App. Oct. 30, 1990)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library, 1990 WL 165952); Texas Health Enter., Inc. v.
Tolden, 795 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.App. 1990); Chavous v. Brown, 396 S.E.2d 98 (S.C.
1990) (all holding Batson does not apply to civil litigation) with Fludd v. Dykes,
863 F.2d 822 (lth Cir. 1989) cel. denied, sub nom. Tiller v. Fludd, 110 S. Ct. 201
(1989); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986); Thomas v.
Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So. 2d 343 (Ala. 1989) (holding that Batson applies to civil trials). The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have declined
to resolve the issue. See Nowlin v. Gen. Tel. Co., 892 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1989);
Robinson v. Quick, 875 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 149
(1989); Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1988); Reynolds v. City
of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990), (finding Batson would apply to civil
trials if state action were present, but expressing reservations as to whether a civil
litigant's exercise of a peremptory challenge constitutes state action), petition for
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 2418 Uan. 12, 1990).
3. Compare Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v.
Gilmore: A Further Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RUTCERS L.
REV. 891 (1988) (favoring application of Batson to civil trials) with, Note, The
Application of Batson v. Kentucky in a Civil Trial Setting, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 173
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The tensions between the historic peremptory challenge
right and society's interest in eradicating discrimination have
evoked strong emotions, but little analysis. Few alternative
methods to combat a civil litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenges have been suggested, much less critiqued. This
article attempts to fill that void.
This article does not suggest that any one proposal for
reform is the "correct" response to discrimination in the
peremptory challenge process. The "optimal" solution depends on too many unquantifiable variables. By defining a
"Batson function"4 that incorporates the relevant variables
and analyzing each proposal's effect on that function, this
article highlights the trade-offs of each proposal and thereby
encourages more informed and reasoned decision making. At
a minimum, however, the analysis demonstrates that Batson
should be extended to limit a civil litigant's ability to discriminate in the jury selection process.
Part Two of this article explains the nature and operation of the peremptory challenge. Part Three provides a brief
description of the leading Supreme Court precedents and
their lower court progeny. Part Four argues that Batson
should apply to civil litigation. This section first demonstrates
that case law and policy dictate that a civil litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge be deemed state action. Then,
through analysis with the Batson function, it concludes that
the many differences between civil and criminal trials do not
justify disparate treatment of discriminatory peremptory challenges in civil and criminal proceedings. Finally, Part Five
suggests and analyzes the merits and shortcomings of several
legislative proposals that may eradicate discrimination in the
juror selection process more fully than Batson.
II.

THE NATURE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

The exercise of challenges is the final stage in the selection of a jury. First, a list of eligible jurors is compiled, typi-

(1990) (rejecting application of Batson to civil litigation); Note, Batson v. Kentucky:
Challenging the Use of the Peremptory Challenge, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 300-01
(1988) (rejecting application of Batson to civil litigation); Note, Vitiation of Peremptory Challenge in Civil Actions: Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 155
(1986) (rejecting application of Batson to civil litigation).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 184-89.
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cally through voter or motor vehicle registration lists.' From
that pool a venire is randomly selected.' Jurors satisfying
specified exemptions, e.g., "undue hardship," are excused.7
The remaining prospective jurors are subjected to voir dire to
elicit information about the jurors' attitudes and possible
prejudices.' The attorneys then are given the opportunity to
challenge individual jurors.
There are two types of juror challenges: challenges for
cause and peremptory challenges. Challenges for cause are
subject to approval by the court and must be based on either
actual9 or implied'0 bias. Each party may exercise an unlimited number of challenges for cause. Peremptory challenges

5. See, e.g., The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §
1864 (1988).
6. Id. § 1861 (1988).
7. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 111-37 (1977).
8. The method of conducting voir dire differs among jurisdictions and
among judges within the same jurisdiction. In federal court, the judge typically
conducts voir dire, although the federal rules afford the judge discretion to allow
counsel to interview prospective jurors. See FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a). Many states give
the primary role of questioning to counsel. See Alschuler, The Supreme Court and
the Juty: Voir Dire, Peremptoty Challenges, and the Review of Juty Verdicts, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 153, 158 n.15 (1989); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptoiy Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 339 n.13
(1982). The permissible scope of voir dire also varies. See Project, Eighteenth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEO. L.J. 489, 974 & n.2093 (1989) [hereinafter Project];
Saltzburg & Powers, supra, at 339 n.13. Judges that view voir dire as a costly
means to indoctrinate jurors will strictly limit permissible questioning. Cf Broeder,
Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 505, 513,
522-25 (1965). Finally, questioning may be directed to the entire panel or to
individual jurors. See Project, supra, at 978 & n.2102. Each of these differences
may produce vastly different results in the degree of impartiality achieved through
voir dire. See Jutywork: Systematic Techniques § 2.05, at 2-18 through 2-35 (1988)
[hereinafter Jutywork].
9. Actual bias refers to a prejudiced state of mind. To exclude a juror for
actual bias, the judge must conclude that the juror cannot overcome her bias and
render a verdict based on the evidence. See Project, supra note 8, at 979-80. Uncomfortable with making subjective judgments about a juror's state of mind, courts
will often give conclusive weight to a juror's statement that they can try a case
fairly. See Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 550 (1975). Jurors, of course, do not readily admit to many forms of
prejudice. Consequently, the challenge for actual bias does not eliminate all forms
of prejudice from the jury.
10. Implied bias is the partiality presumed by law from the existence of certain relationships or interests of the prospective juror. For example, a juror related to a party or having a financial interest in the case may be eliminated for
implied bias. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 143. The grounds for finding
implied bias are typically defined by statute. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 143.
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are limited in number," but historically could be exercised
for any reason or no reason at all.'
A desire to obtain a jury devoid of partiality or bias
justifies the arbitrary exclusion of randomly selected jurors.
Partiality and bias have a unique meaning in the context of
the peremptory challenge. The law presumes a juror not
challenged for cause is impartial and unbiased. Nevertheless,
potential jurors do not have the same background, experience, values or preconceptions. They may possess a range or
spectrum of conscious and unconscious biases that do not
rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause. The peremptory challenge permits a party to seek elimination of those
prospective jurors that the party believes are most predisposed to their opponent's case. In theory, when both sides
eliminate the prospective jurors at the edges of the "partiality
spectrum" (but not over the line marking a challenge for
cause), the remaining jurors will fall somewhere near the
middle of the spectrum of biases and a fairer trial will result.' Additionally, the parties will perceive the jury as fair.

11. In civil trials in federal court, each party is entitled to three peremptory
challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). This is substantially fewer than that provided
litigants in criminal felony cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). The number of peremptory challenges provided civil litigants in state courts varies from two to eight. See
J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 282-84. State courts typically provide a greater
number of peremptories to parties in criminal trials. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7,
at 282-84.
12. For a discussion of the history of peremptory challenges, see Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214-17 (1965); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 145-51.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), of course, imposed some limits on a
prosecutor's ability to exercise peremptory challenges without stating a reason for
the challenge. See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
The procedure for the exercise of peremptory challenges is generally left to
the discretion of the trial court, although it is occasionally prescribed by statute.
Under the most common system, the "box" system, a juror challenged peremptorily is randomly replaced in the jury box by one of the remaining prospective jurors. That juror then may be questioned and challenged for cause or peremptorily. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 146. This process is repeated until all parties
are satisfied with the jury or have exercised all their peremptory challenges. By
contrast, some courts employ a "struck jury" system. Under that approach, the
court and attorneys question jurors and exercise their challenges for cause until
they "qualify" a number of jurors equal to the sum of the desired jury size and
the total number of peremptories of the parties. The parties then alternate "striking" jurors peremptorily until they reach the final jury size. Id. at 146-47. Variations of either system are possible. See id; Massaro, Peremptories or Peels? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REV. 501, 519 n.104
(1986).
13. See infra note 240. Nevertheless, based on empirical evidence, some
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"[I]n a real sense the jury belongs to the litigant: he chooses
it. " " Consequently, the litigant, and through her the com-

munity, will view the jury determination as valid and deserving respect. 5 The appearance of impartiality is as important
as the reality.
The theoretical basis for the peremptory challenge is not
limited to eliminating partiality falling short of the level justifying a challenge for cause. The peremptory challenge may
also serve to eliminate bias that crosses the "for cause"
threshold, but which could not be proved to the trial court's
satisfaction. Challenges for cause are defined narrowly and it
is often difficult to prove hidden or unconscious
prejudices. 6 Moreover, extremely biased jurors may lie or
otherwise try to hide their prejudices. A party may eliminate
such jurors with a premptory challenge. Additionally, the
peremptory challenge protects the exercise of the challenge
for cause by allowing a party to remove a juror whom he has
voir dire aimed at identifying
alienated through extensive
7
possible prejudices.'
A conflict arises, however, because attorneys often have
insufficient information to make individual judgments about
the unconscious or hidden prejudices of prospective jurors.
Consequently, attorneys tend to act on the basis of stereotypes and presumptions. The legal literature is replete with
suggestions for choosing the "ideal" juror based on demographic stereotypes - race, age, sex and employment. 8 For
example, traditional trial lawyer lore dictates that "in complicated cases the young should be preferred over the old
and men over women .... The Irish, Italians, Jews, French,

blacks, Chicanos and those of Balkan heritage are said to
sympathize with plaintiffs in civil suits and defendants in
criminal actions."' 9 Some of these generalizations are based

commentators suggest that attorneys are generally ineffective at using voir
and peremptory challenges to identify and eliminate juror partiality. See,
Alschuler, supra note 8, at 203; Massaro, supra note 12, at 523-25 & n.109.
14. Babcock, supra note 9, at 552.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 9.
17. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 8, at 356; Babcock, supra note
554-55.
18. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 521 n.107; J. VAN DYKE, supra note
152-54; Note, supra note 3, 40 RUTGERs L. REV. at 930 n.171.
19. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 153.

dire
e.g.,

9, at
7, at
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upon ingrained prejudices. Others may be the result of "rational discrimination."" In either case, the result is often
the same: entire groups of individuals, typically minorities,"1
are removed from the jury. This discrimination exacerbates
the existing under-representation of minorities in the jury
selection process, 2 and has raised equal protection challenges to the race-based use of peremptory challenges.
III.

THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE IN CRIMINAL LIGATION

A. From Swain to Batson
The Supreme Court first addressed the equal protection
implications of race-based use of peremptory challenges in
Swain v. Alabama.2" In Swain, the prosecutor exercised his
peremptory challenges to strike six black jurors from the jury
venire.24 The defendant was convicted of rape by an all
white jury and sentenced to death.25 The Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's contention that the jury selection
process violated his equal protection rights.26 It held that

20. "Rational discrimination," a term borrowed from Professor Strauss, is a
generalization of the economists' notion of "efficient discrimination." See Strauss,
The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 108. In the peremptory challenge context, using an explicit racial classification is "rational discrimination" if
race is the best available proxy for determining juror partiality. For example, if an
attorney represents a Ku Klux Klan member, a challenge to all black jurors would
be rational discrimination. More subtly, there is extensive research indicating that
prospective jurors will tend to sympathize with parties who share a group identity.
See Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup.
CT. REV. 97, 129-30. Exercising peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors of the
same race as the client therefore might also be considered rational discrimination,
particularly given the often limited information available through voir dire.
21. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 154-60; Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptoty Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227,
232-33 (1986). There appears to be a greater number of juror stereotypes about
minority group members. Moreover, it is often impossible for the exercise of peremptory challenges to eliminate all majority group members from the jury panel,
particularly in civil trials, where each side receives only a small number of
peremptories.
22. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 28-35, 311-30. Among the reasons
offered for the underrepresentation of minorities on jury panels is the reliance on
voter registration lists, which still underrepresents minorities, the larger percentage
of minorities excused from jury service, and the greater likelihood of challenge if
minorities do make it to the jury venire. Id. at 30-31.

23. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
24. Swain, 380 U.S. at 210.
25. Id. at 203.
26. Id. at 221. The Court also rejected the defendant's claims that the grand
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to justify his peremptothe prosecutor could not be required
27
case.
particular
a
in
ry challenges
The Court began by tracing the long history of
peremeptory challenges."8 The Court found that the persistence of peremptories and their extensive use demonstrated
that the peremptory challenge was "a necessary part of trial
by jury."2 9 The Court believed the peremptory was necessary not only to secure fair and impartial juries," but to
"satisfy the appearance of justice.""' The Court frankly admitted that prosecutors often exercise peremptory challenges
"on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings
or official action, namely the race, religion, nationality, occu-2
pation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty."
the Court found that subjecting the
Nevertheless,
prosecutor's challenges in a particular case to the traditional
standards of the equal protection clause would undermine
the historic importance of the peremptory challenge.3 3 The
Court refused to do this and specifically authorized challenges, in any individual case, based on group affiliations.3 4
However, unwilling to concede that the prosecutor could
never violate a defendant's equal protection rights, the Court
suggested that a defendant could state an equal protection
claim when a prosecutors' office consistently and systematically exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks
from the jury panel in all cases.3 5 Despite the defendant's
showing that no black had served on the petit jury in
Talladega County in almost fifteen years, the Court found no
violation. 6 It reasoned that the defendant did not meet its
burden of proving that the state alone was responsible for
the exclusion of blacks from the jury. 7

jury and petit jury venires were discriminatorily selected. Id. at 205-09.
27. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.
28. Id. at 212-21.
29. Id. at 219.
30. Id. at 212.
31. Id. at 219.
32. Id. at 220.
33. Id. at 221-22.
34. Id. at 221.
35. Id. at 223-24.
36. Id. at 226.
37. Id. Three justices dissented from the Court's finding that there was insufficient evidence of systematic state discrimination. Id. at 246-47 (Goldberg, J.,
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Commentators' reactions to the decision in Swain were
swift and hostile."8 Courts were equally antagonistic. The
Second Circuit sarcastically labeled a section heading dealing
with the showing required by Swain as "Mission Impossible." 9 The Massachusetts Supreme Court called the
defendant's burden under Swain "Sysyphean."4 ° The results
of defendant challenges to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges following Swain justified these characterizations. Only two reported cases, both from Louisiana, found
that a defendant had proved systematic state discrimination."' Believing injustice would otherwise result, several
state and federal courts used state constitutional provisions
or the sixth amendment of the federal Constitution to circumvent Swain's strictures.42 In 1983, the Court denied certiorari in a case raising challenges to the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury, but
expressed interest in reconsidering Swain at a later date.4 3

dissenting). The dissenting justices agreed, however, that absent systematic exclusion, "a prosecutor's motives are [not] subject to question or judicial inquiry when
he excludes Negroes or any other group from sitting on a jury in a particular
case." Id. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 12, at 536-41; Kuhn, Juty Discrimination: The
Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on
the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory
Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of ProspectiveJurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. LJ.
157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A ConstitutionalBlueprint for the Peipetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Mishkin, The Supreme Court
1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56, 135-39 (1965).
39. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S.
1001 (1986).
40. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, n.10, 387 N.E.2d 499, 509 n.10,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
41. See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1983) (en
banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984), citing State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751
(La. 1979) and State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979); see also Note,
supra note 3, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. at 273 & n.66.
42. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 881 (1979); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986); Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). Many courts,
however, were unwilling to evade Swain's guidelines. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 82 n.1; Pizzi, supra note 20, at 105-06 & n.56.
43. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). Justices Stevens, Blackmun and
Powell expressed a willingness to reconsider Swain, but concurred in the denial of
certiorari so that greater experience could be obtained through state court ex-
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Finally, in 1986, the Court decided Batson v. Kentucky44 and
sharply limited, if not overruled, Swain.
B.

Batson v. Kentucky

In Batson, following court conducted voir dire, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black
persons on the venire. The defendant, a black man, was
convicted of second degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods

by

an

all

white jury.46

The

trial

court

denied

defendant's equal protection and sixth amendment attacks on
the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges and the
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the defendant's claim that he
had been denied his sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury by the prosecutor's discriminatory peremptory challenges.47 The Court did not decide the sixth amendment claim,
but reversed the lower court on equal protection grounds.4 8
The Court first emphasized its long-standing commitment to the principle that a "State's purposeful or deliberate
denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as
jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 49 The Court recounted at length its application of this principle in cases raising challenges to the selection of the jury venire.5" The Court detailed the three bases
for its anti-discrimination principle: the right of a defendant
"to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant
to non-discriminatory criteria;" the right of a prospective
juror not to be assumed incompetent for and to be excluded
from jury service because of race; and the community's inter-

perimentation. Id. at 962. Justices Marshall and Brennan, wishing to immediately
reconsider Swain, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Id. at 963.

44. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
45. Id. at 82-83.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 84 & n.4. The defendant apparently believed that Swain foreclosed
his equal protection claim. Id. at 83.
48. Id. at 84 n.4. The Court has subsequently admitted that it departed "dramatically from its normal procedure without explanation" by accepting certiorari
on one constitutional question and deciding the case under a different constitutional provision without benefit of briefing or argument. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S.
Ct. 803, 811 n.3 (1990).
49. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
50. Id. at 85-88.
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est in preserving "public confidence in the fairness of our
system of justice."5 Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
found these same interests to be equally applicable to the
stage of the jury selection process at issue in Batson. Thus,
Justice Powell wrote, "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of
their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group
will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against
a black defendant."

52

According to the Court, the error in Swain was not a
failure to recognize the Court's established equal protection
doctrine, but the imposition of a crippling burden of proof
on the accused.5" Based on the standards developed in the
jury venire cases, it was no longer necessary to demonstrate
systematic exclusion of blacks over a number of cases to
prove an equal protection violation.54 Rather, under the
new "evidentiary formulation 5 5 a defendant need only establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the
ongoing litigation. The defendant initially must show that he
or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of defendant's race. 5 The trial
court must then consider whether these facts and any other
relevant circumstances, such as a pattern of strikes against
black jurors or the prosecutor's questions during voir dire,

51. Id. at 85-87; see also Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 812 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. The Court specifically declined to express any
views on whether the Constitution imposed similar limitations on the exercise of
peremptory challenges by defense counsel. Id. at 89 n.12. Justice Burger opined
that "the clear and inescapable import" of the Court's holding would be to limit
defense attorney's use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 125-26 (Burger, J., dissenting). Most courts that have addressed the issue have stated that restrictions on the
exercise of peremptory challenges must be applied equally to the defense and
prosecution. See, e.g., People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555
N.Y.S.2d 647, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990); United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d
541, 565 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), vacated, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987) and cases cited
therein. Nevertheless, the issue may not be as easy as Justice Burger suggests. See,
e.g., Goldwasser, Limiting A Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptoiy Challenges: On
Symmetry and the Juy in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808 (1989) (arguing
that Batson should not be applied to defense counsel).
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
54. Id. at 94-95.
55. Id. at 93.
56. Id. at 96; but see infra note 85.
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raise an inference of purposeful discrimination.5 7 If the trial
court finds a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
shifts to the state to justify its challenges with a neutral explanation.5 8 The Court emphasized that "the prosecutor may
not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination
by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's
race on the assumption - or his intuitive judgment - that they
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared
race."" Finally, the Court rejected the State's claim that its
holding would eviscerate the fair trial values served by the
peremptory challenge or create serious administrative difficulties.6" The experience in states that had previously adopted
similar evidentiary formulations convinced the Court that the
State's concerns were unwarranted. 6 The Court remanded
the case to the trial court to rule on the defendant's objection in the first instance.6 2

57. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
58. Id. at 97.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 98-99.
61. Id. at 99.
62. Id. at 100. In light of the variety of jury selection procedures, the Court
declined to instruct lower courts how to best implement its holding. For example,
the Court did not indicate whether, upon a showing of purposeful discrimination,
the lower court should dismiss the entire venire or disallow the discriminatory
challenge and renew selection with the improperly selected juror reinstated on the
panel. Id. at 99 n.24.
Although six justices joined Justice Powell's opinion, several also chose to
write separately. Justices White and O'Connor, in separate opinions, emphasized
that the Batson decision should not be applied retroactively. Id. at 102 (White, J.,
concurring); Id. at 111 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Marshall expressed the
view that the Court's decision would not end the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. That result, he opined, could only be accomplished by completely
eliminating peremptory challenges. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, defended the Court's decision to address issues that were not raised in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 108-10 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justices Burger and Rehnquist dissented. The then Chief Justice
believed that the Court improperly reached the Equal Protection issue and lamented that the Court's decision on the merits failed to apply traditional equal protection principles and would undermine the ability of the peremptory challenge to
ensure the impartiality essential to a fair trial. Id. at 112 (Burger, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for overruling the principal holding of
Swain under the pretext of adjusting "evidentiary burdens." Id. at 134 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). On the merits, he argued that there was no Equal Protection violation because the peremptory challenge permitted the State to use crude stereotypes to eliminate all groups equally. Id. at 137-38. He also viewed the use of
"proxies" by the State as too important to the elimination of bias to subject the
State's exercise of peremptory challenges in a given case to court scrutiny. Id. at
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Although the Court in Batson suggested that it was merely tinkering with Swain's "evidentiary formulation," the Court
did much more. The Court in Swain specifically rejected any
claim of discrimination based on the exercise of
peremptories at a single trial. By contrast, the Batson Court
recognized the utility of the peremptory challenge, but found
society's interest in eliminating discrimination in the selection
of even a single jury to be of overriding importance. Equally
meaningful, the Court found the State's interest in "rational
discrimination" to be insufficient to justify raced-based peremptory challenges. Although in-group bias may be a recognized phenomenon," assumptions based on race are not
cognizable justifications for the exclusion of black jurors
under Batson. The balance between the interests in impartiality and freedom from discrimination was significantly altered.
C.

Implementation of Batson

Lower courts have not applied the guidelines established
in Batson uniformly. Courts differ about the quantum of
proof necessary for a defendant to establish a prima facie
case. As Justice Marshall feared,64 some courts have refused
to find a prima facie case whenever the prosecutor has left
one or more minority members on the jury.6 5 Other courts
have questioned whether striking only a small number of
minority jurors, even if no minority members remain on the
panel, should constitute a prima facie case.66 By contrast,
several courts have been willing to find a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination even if not all minorities, or if only
a small number, have been removed from the jury.67 Two
138-39.
63. See Pizzi, supra note 20, at 129-30.
64. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 1986),
denied, 481 U.S. 1037 (1987); United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851
cert.
(8th Cir. 1987); Fleming v. Kemp, 637 F. Supp. 1547, 1553 (M.D. Ga. 1986), affid
sub nom. Fleming v. Zant, 837 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1988), cerr. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1764 (1989); United States v. David, 662 F. Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aTfd,
844 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1988); State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 481, 358 S.E.2d
365, 369 (1987); Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 60, 716 S.W.2d 751, 754 (1986); see
also United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1989).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Alvis v. U.S., 484 U.S. 928 (1987); Allen v. State, 726 S.W.2d 636, 639-40
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 & n.4 (9th Cir.
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courts, as an aid to judicial efficiency, even have required the
prosecutor to provide rebuttal reasons whenever the prosecutor strikes a black juror from the panel.6 8
Lower courts differ concerning which explanations by
the prosecutor are sufficient to rebut an inference of discrimination. Many lower courts have accepted subjective explanations such as "failure to maintain eye contact," 69 "poor attitude in answering voir dire questions,"7" and undesirable
"posture and demeanor.""' Other courts have accepted explanations that may serve as proxies for race, for example,
that the juror lives in the same neighborhood as the defendant.72 A few courts do not even require rebuttal of all the
questioned peremptory challenges when the prosecutor has
explained a few to the court's satisfaction.7" Again, not all
courts are as lax. Many courts will scrutinize the prosecutor's
explanations and find them pretextual if the prosecutor did

1989); United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835, 109 S.
Ct. 97 (1988); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (lth Cir. 1987), vacated in part on other
grounds, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988); United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1987); State v. Collier, 553
So.2d 815, 819 (La. 1989). Many courts refuse to rely on numerical statistics alone
and look to the "totality of circumstances." See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 880
F.2d 101, 102-03 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d at 1140;
United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d at 746-48.
68. See State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 553 A.2d 166, 171-72 (1989), cel.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 2078 (1989); State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703
(1987).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5tl Cir. 1987);
Townsend v. State, 730 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); see also United States
v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94-95 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1988).
70. United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Alvis v. United States, 484 U.S. 928 (1987); see also United States v. Roberts,
913 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1990) ("disinterested").
71. United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1987). See also
Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 648 (lth Cir. 1990) ("gut feeling, based
on facial expression"); United States v. Melton, 883 F.2d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1989)
("chewing gum and was generally inattentive"); United States v. Johnson, 721 F.
Supp. 1077, 1080-81 (E.D. Mo. 1989) ("body language"), aftld, 905 F.2d 222 (8th
Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 304 (1990).
72. See, e.g., Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 347-48, 358 S.E.2d
590, 592-93 (1987). See also Lynn v. Alabama, 110 S. Ct. 351, 352 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
73. See, e.g., United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (lth Cir. 1986);
State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683, 695-97, 525 A.2d 528, 535, appeal denied, 204
Conn. 807, 528 A.2d 1154 (1987).
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not challenge similarly situated non-minority jurors.7"
The fact-based inquiry required to create or rebut an
inference of purposeful discrimination has permitted courts
that are less than enamored with Batson to restrict its impact.7 5 As a result, Batson has not eliminated discrimination
in the selection of jurors. Although, Batson has undoubtedly
reduced the degree of such discrimination, it has also
spawned extensive motion practice and hundreds of appeals.
76
Several commentators have criticized Batson on that basis.
D.

The Continuing Vitality of the Batson Rationale

Despite the increased litigation costs and less than optimal results, the Batson decision remains easy to justify. Our
aspiration for a colorblind society is too important to sacrifice to expediency. It is essential that the judicial system take
a strong stand against racism. As the Court has recognized,
"[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects,
" 77
is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.
Although the prohibition against racial discrimination in the
selection of a jury may not be fully effective, it at least
brings us closer to our goal of a society where race is irrelevant. Some judges have raised more fundamental objections
to the Batson decision. Enforcement problems aside, they
question whether race-based exercise of peremptory challenges actually discriminates against or stigmatizes minority juThey reason that prosecutors are merely acrors.7

74. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1989);
Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 484 U.S. 898 (1987);
Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 691 (N.D. ILL.), vacated on other grounds
sub noa. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988); State v. Collier, 553
So.2d 815, 822 (La. 1989).
75. See, e.g. United States v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D. Mo.
denied, III S. Ct. 304 (1990); State v.
1989), affid, 905 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.), cert.
Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 76-77, 362 S.E.2d 641, 643-44 (1987) (Ness, C.J., dissenting).
Lower court findings concerning a defendant's prima facie case or the
prosecutor's rebuttal explanations are given great deference and reversed only if
clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559, 561-62
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1818 (1990); United States v. Fuller, 887
(5th Cir. 1989), cert.
F.2d 144, 146 (8th Cir. 1989), ce. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2592 (1990).
76. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 8, at 169; Pizzi, supra note 20, at 134.
77. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 224, (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); King v. County of Nassua, 581 F. Supp.
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knowledging the recognized phenomenon of in-group bias
and are attempting to eliminate such bias in all groups equally. They also observe that the excluded juror can always serve
on another jury, and hence, neither the juror nor the community suffers any significant injury.
That a minority juror eventually may be seated on another jury or that other groups face similar discrimination cannot justify race-based exercises of peremptory challenges. To
be classified based on group stereotypes is to be treated as
less than an individual. Given the long history and continued
pervasiveness of racism in this country, group-based decision
making in even one case can stigmatize minority group members. Moreover, because many of the group-based stereotypes
will be applicable in a wide range of cases, entire groups
may be excluded from the jury process. 79 For example,
some 'Jury experts" view African-Americans as relatively sympathetic to defendants in criminal cases.8 0 Prosecutors in
some jurisdictions, therefore, may seek to remove virtually all
African-Americans from criminal juries. Thus, the Batson rule
not only prevents the repeated stigmatization that the minority group member would otherwise incur, but protects the
minority community's voice in the administration of justice.
Involvement in the trial process is one of the unique participatory features in our democracy and helps preserve public
confidence in the fairness of our justice system. Such participation is especially critical for minority group members,
many of whom already view the judicial system as "the white
man's court."81 Yes, as Justice Rehnquist suggests, 2 other

493, 502 (E.D. N.Y. 1984); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965);
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 8, at 364.
79. As voir dire becomes increasingly perfunctory, forcing litigants to further
rely on broad stereotypes rather than case-specific information, the danger that
minority group members will be eliminated from the jury only grows.
80. See supra notes 18-19. Similarly, in civil litigation, certain minority groups
are reputed to have pro-plaintiff biases. Id.
81. This perception has some basis in reality. See, e.g., Report of the Supreme
Court Task Force on Race/Ethnic Issues in the Courts, reprinted in 69 MICH. B.J.
375, (1990) [hereinafter Report]. Minority members comprise a disproportionately
small segment of the state and federal judiciary. See, e.g., id. at 379. The Justice
Department has argued that many southern states elect their judges in a discriminatory manner. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1. Statistics comparing
conviction rates and death sentences between Afro-American and white defendants
also support the perception of a racist judicial system. See, e.g., McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-89 (1987); see generally Report, supra, at 378 (general

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

groups also may face group-based generalizations. But nonminority groups have not been subjected to the same historical discrimination and therefore do not incur the same stigmatization suffered by minority group members. Also, given
the limited number of allotted peremptory challenges, majority groups are less likely to be completely excluded from the
jury.83 In any event, that other groups face discrimination
compounds the infirmity of the system, it does not justify
race-based decision-making.
Despite some difference in opinion about the value of
the Batson holding, its continuing vitality cannot be questioned. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that
Batson remains the law. 4 Indeed, five justices, focusing on
the injuries to the excluded juror and the community,
opined that a defendant may raise a Batson challenge even if
the defendant is not of the same race as the excluded ju85
ror.
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide

information concerning the relation between race of victim and defendant and the
conviction/acquittal rate).
82. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. Cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (although all groups had
separate educational facilities, separate facilities held inherently unequal).
84. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 809-11 (1990); see also Alvarado v.
United States, 110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990) (per curiam).
85. Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 811 (Kennedy, J., concurring), at 812 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Holland, the Court rejected a white
defendant's claim that exclusion of black jurors from his jury panel violated his
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. The defendant had not pursued an
equal protection claim before the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, five justices indicated Batson would have supported such a claim if it had been raised. Those
justices reasoned that the defendant would have had third party standing to
protect the interests of the excluded jurors and the community. Id. at 812.
The first element of Batson's prima facie case required a showing by the
defendant that the prosecutor had "exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (emphasis
added). Accordingly, most lower courts that had addressed the issue had assumed
Batson required the defendant and the excluded juror to be from the same racial
group. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (9th Cir.
1987); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1988). Post-Holland cases
should not impose that requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d
1444, 1448 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Dawn v. United States, 111 S.
Ct. 389; People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 654 n.3, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1244 n.3, 555
N.Y.S.2d 647, 656 n.3, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990); but see Congdon v. State,
260 Ga. 173, 176 & n.2, 391 S.E.2d 402, 404 & n.2 (1990), petition for cert. filed,
No. 90-5491 (U.S. Aug. 15, 1990).
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whether the Batson decision also applies in civil litigation."
Commentators and lower courts have reached conflicting
conclusions.8 7 The next section addresses this issue.
IV.

APPLICATION OF BATSON TO CMvL LITIGATION

The fourteenth amendment provides that "No State
shall .. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.""8 This language does not distinguish
between criminal and civil trials. Nevertheless, the protections
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment change with the
context.8 9 Although there are a myriad of differences between civil and criminal litigation, this article demonstrates
that few of these differences influence the balance of interests struck by Batson. Accordingly, the article concludes that
Batson should apply to civil litigation. First, however, it is
necessary to address whether the exercise of peremptory
challenges by a private litigant constitutes "state action."90
Absent "state action," the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution is not operational. 9 Although Supreme
Court precedents in this area are ambiguous, the policies
justifying the state action requirement unequivocably support
treating a private litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge as state action.

86. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 11 S. Ct. 41 (1990)
87. See supra notes 2-3.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution, through the fifth amendment due process clause, also requires the
federal government to provide equal protection of the laws. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 & n.4 (1954).
89. For example, an indigent criminal defendant has the right to appointed
counsel for her first appeal and is entitled to a waiver of filing and transcript
fees. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 607 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-57 (1963). Indigent litigants in civil trials enjoy no such rights. See
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973).
90. In Batson 476 U.S. 79, it was unnecessary to address the state action
issue. The conduct of a state prosecutor, an agent of the state, is unquestionably
state action.
91. Race-based peremptory challenges still might be prohibited through application of state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Housing Auth., 321
N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988); Miami v. Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), appeal dismissed, 469 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1985); Holley v. J & S Sweeping
Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1983); or the court's supervisory
powers, see, e.g., Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 897 (D. Conn.
1986); see also Note, supra note 3, 40 RUTGERs L. REV. at 959-61.
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State Action Precedent

The equal protection clause does not prohibit conduct
9
by private parties, "however discriminatory or wrongful." "
Thus, to establish a violation of their constitutional rights,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the state, and not merely a
private individual, was the source of the purposeful discrimination. Although this principle is easily stated, the question
whether challenged conduct constitutes state action "admits
of no easy answer."93 As the amount of interaction between
the private individual and the state grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to discern where private conduct ends and
state action begins. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
4 The
private conduct be attributed its true significance."
Court has articulated several formulaic tests, such as the
"public function," "state compulsion," and "joint action" tests
to aid in this analysis. 5 The ultimate question, however, is
whether the private conduct fairly can be attributed to the
state.9 6
A strong factual argument can be made that a private
litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenges are fairly attributable to the state. The state is intimately involved in the
jury selection process. The excluded juror is summoned to

92. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,13 (1948).
93. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
94. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
95. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545-47 & n.29
(1987); see also J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 426-42
(3d ed. 1986).
96. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936-37; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838
(1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). This circularity conduct is treated as that of the state if it is state action and conduct is state
action if it is fairly attributable to the state - may be one reason that the state
action cases have been called a "conceptual disaster area." See, e.g., Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 504 (1985); Friendly, The
Public-Private Penumbra - Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1290
(1982); Black, Foreward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition
14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 70 (1967). The absence of a single theory of rights or
policy basis to explain the case law contributes to the analytical difficulty in the
area. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1691-99 (2d ed. 1988); Brest,
State Action and Liberal Theoty: A Casenote On Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1296, 1297-1302 (1982); see also infra notes 140-72 and accompanying text.
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court through a government-issued subpoena. The state requires the juror to appear in a designated courtroom, a government forum open to the public."7 The court supervises
the questioning during voir dire, often acting as the sole
questioner. Through its control of the information that may
be discovered about the venire, the court affects the exercise
of both peremptory and for cause challenges.9 8 The Court
rules on all challenges for cause and thereby influences the
number of and identity of the jurors subject to peremptory
challenge. The peremptory challenge itself is a government
created and highly regulated right. The state defines the
number of peremptory challenges available to each party.
The government, by statute or through the court, regulates
the procedure for making such challenges. The peremptory
challenge is exercised by an officer of the court and enforced, with the full coercive powers of the state, by the
court.99 Often, counsel make the peremptory challenge outside the presence of the venire. Thus, when the court excuses a juror, the juror may .not know who was responsible for
their removal from the jury. In such cases, the "inference is
inescapable to both the excluded jurors and the public""'
that the state is responsible for the jurors' exclusion. This
perception is critical because two of the primary injuries
created by race-based peremptory challenges - stigmatization
of the excluded juror and loss of public confidence in the
0 -depend upon public perceptions.0 2 Although
judiciary"'

97. The public, therefore, will be able to observe any judicial tolerance of the
alleged racial discrimination. See People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 1088-89,
526 N.Y.S.2d 986, 992-93 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
98. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 232 (5th Cir.)
(en banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting), cet. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
99. Most often, the judge excuses the challenged juror. On occasion, the
court clerk may perform this function.
100. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 657, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d
647, 657 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990). In some cases, however,
counsels' questions during voir dire may suggest which litigant chooses to challenge the excluded juror.
101. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
102. In the past, the Court has considered public perceptions relevant to the
state action determination. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 724 (1961); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972); San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 557-58
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); but cf Schneider, State Action - Making Sense Out of
Chaos - An Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 737, 762 (1985) (suggesting
there has been a "dimunition of any consideration of public expectations in
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many of these state involvements alone may be insufficient to
support a finding of state action,"0 3 their aggregate should
be enough to fairly attribute private conduct to the state." 4
This is especially true when the private conduct is racial discrimination, which generally has been thought to require a
otherwise be
lesser showing of state involvement than would
0 5
action.
state
of
finding
a
support
to
required
Application of the Court's formulaic tests and analogy to
Supreme Court precedent arguably provide further support
for finding that a civil litigant's race-based exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action. The Court has
held that when a private party engages in an "exclusively
public function," his or her conduct may be considered state
action. 106 The state cannot free itself from the limitations
of the Constitution merely by delegating state functions to
private individuals. For example, the Supreme Court has held
that a state cannot exclude blacks from voting by delegating
to a private political organization the task of determining the
qualification of voters.'0 7 In Teriy v. Adams, 0 8 the Court
reviewed the Jay Bird Democratic Association's practice of
holding its own pre-primary election of nominees. The voluntary club of white Texas Democrats excluded blacks from

determining the proper scope of state action").
103. For example, counsel's identity as an officer of the court alone is an
insufficient basis to treat her conduct as state action. See Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312 (1981).
104. The Court, on several occasions, has considered the cumulative impact of
various state involvements when making the state action determination. See, e.g.,
Tulsa Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1988); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961); but see Rendell-Baker v.
majority
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 848 n.1 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (accusing tile
of failing to consider the cumulative impact of the state's involvements); Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 360 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same).
105. See, e.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081,
1088, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986, 993 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 540;
Friendly, supra note 95, at 1291; Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power
and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV.
1003, 1035 (1973).
106. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (dicta);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932) (election); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 507-08 (1946) (company town); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966)
(municipal park).
107. See, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953).
108. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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their pre-primary election and the winner, with few exceptions, ran unopposed in the primary."' The Court held
that the club was subject to the restrictions of the fifteenth
amendment even though there was a complete absence of
formal state connection to any of the club's political activities. The majority of justices, although writing separately,
appeared to agree that the relationship between the club's
practice and the electoral system constituted the delegation
of a public function subjecting the club's practice to the
fifteenth amendment." ° Similarly, conducting jury trials is a
historic government function. The Court even has equated
exclusion from participation in the jury process with the
denial of the elective franchise."' A state should not be
permitted to delegate the power to determine the composition of juries and then disclaim responsibility for the predictably discriminatory way in which counsel exercise that authority.
The Court has also found state action where the government has encouraged or enforced the challenged activity of a
private party. For example, in Shelley v. Kraemer,"2 the
Court held that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive
covenant constituted state action, notwithstanding that the
decisions to include and seek enforcement of the discriminatory clause were made exclusively by private parties.1" s State action existed because "the State ha[d] made
available to [persons seeking to discriminate] the full coercive
power of government ... ."
Similarly, in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co.," the Court found state action when a
private party made use of ex parte state attachment procedures to deprive another person of her property. The Court
reasoned that the state had created the attachment procedures and, through the actions of the court and sheriff, participated in the seizure. Thus, even though the decision to

109. Id. at 463.
110. See id. at 469 (Black, J.), 484 (Clark, J., concurring).
111. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
112. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
113. In She/ley, a white property owner wanted to sell his property to a minority purchaser. Third parties, not the seller or buyer, sought to enforce the restrictive covenant governing the land. Id. at 5-6.
114. I& at 19.
115. 457 U.S. 922, 939-42 (1982).
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seek the attachment was purely private, the government assistance and enforcement converted the private actions to state
action. Analogously, a private attorney may seek to exercise a
discriminatory peremptory challenge, but it is not effective
until the court enforces the decision and the marshall escorts
the juror from the courtroom.
Finally, the Court has found state action where there are
sufficient contacts between the private party and the state to
create either the appearance of state authority or the creation of a "symbiotic relationship" between the private and
public entities. In the leading case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,"8 the Court held that a privately owned restaurant which leased space in a government parking facility
could not refuse service to racial minorities. Although the
government did not command or encourage the discrimination, the private party's location and status as a lessee of the
government, and its concommitant appearance of state authority, contributed to the Court's finding of state action.
The Court reasoned that the state had "not only made itself
a party to the refusal of service, but ha[d] elected to place its
power, property, and prestige behind the admitted discrimination ...

."'

The

same

might

be

said

about

the

judiciary's enforcement of discrimination in government
courtrooms, particularly when jurors frequently are unaware
8
of the source of the discrimination."
Despite these arguments, the precedent supporting a
finding of state action in the jury selection process is not
overwhelming. Each of the above discussed cases is distinguishable and there are other cases that can be cited to refute a finding of state action.
In Terry v. Adams, the state legislature knowingly permitted the Jaybird Club to conduct its pre-primary election to
perpetuate discrimination. This type of discrimination had
previously been held illegal when more directly perpetrated
by the state." 9 In such circumstances, a finding of purposeful state discrimination was compelled. The judiciary has not

116. 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961).
117. Id. at 725.
118. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
119. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73 (1932).
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been accused of such purposeful discrimination in the administration of the peremptory challenge process.
Shelley v. Kraemers involved the enforcement of a provision discriminatory on its face against a party who did not
wish to discriminate. Compulsion of facially discriminatory
restrictions justified a finding of purposeful discrimination. A
litigant's peremptory challenges, by contrast, are facially neutral. The challenges are private choices that the court accepts, but does not compel. If mere enforcement of private,
facially-neutral choices constituted state action, virtually no
private decisions would be immune from constitutional restraint. For example, if a party seeking to prevent
African-Americans from dining in his or her home sought
enforcement of state trespass laws, judicial enforcement
would convert the private discrimination to state action. Shelley has not been read so broadly. 2 ' Lugar v. Edmonson Oil
Co. is not to the contrary. In Lugar, the Court specifically
limited its holding to the particular context of prejudgment
attachment. 121
Finally, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, through
gradual erosion, has limited precedential power. 22 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the government and private party in Burton had a fiscal relationship and the government profited from the private discrimination. 123 No such
financial relationship exists between the state and the private
litigant.
Although the court decisions cited to support a finding
of state action are readily distinguishable, the cases cited to
refute a finding of state action are equally unpersuasive.
Those denying that a private litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenges constitute state action 124 primarily rely on
Polk Co. v. Dodson.12 5 In Polk, the actions of a public de-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See, e.g., Goldwasser, supra note 52, at 818.
457 U.S. 922, 939 n.21. (1982).
See L. TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1701 n.13.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 84243 (1982).
See, e.g., Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 222 (5th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); Thomas v. Diversified Contrac-

tors, Inc., 551 So.2d 343, 352 (Ala. 1989) (Houston, J., dissenting); Goldwasser,
supra note 52, at 816; Note, supra note 3, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. at 176; see also

Chavous v. Brown, 396 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1990); Wright, Litigating the State Action
Issue in Peremptoty Challenge Cases, 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoC. 573, 585 (1990).
125. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
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fender, paid by the state, were held not to be state action.
Those opposed to a finding of state action reason that if a
public defender is not a state actor, a private litigant surely
cannot be. Polk, however, only held that a public defender
was not a state actor when seeking to withdraw from pursuing a frivolous appeal. The Court has found public defenders
to be state actors in other contexts. 26 A finding of state
action in Polk would have risked a substantial infringment on
counsel's liberty interest. 12 7 Counsel might have been required to continue the employment relationship against her
will. Similar risks are not posed if a private litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge is deemed state action. Professor Tribe has also distinguished Polk as involving no constitutionally troublesome rule or criterion.128 In short, although
Polk holds that trial counsel's status as an officer of the court
alone does not make his or her conduct state action, it does
not preclude finding attorney conduct to be state action
without considering the "totality of circumstances" involved.
The Fifth Circuit has also cited Blum v. Yaretsky129 to

support its decision that a private litigant's discriminatory
peremptory challenge is not state action.'
In Blum, the
plaintiffs challenged a nursing home's decision to transfer
them to a facility providing a lower level of care. They alleged that the nursing home violated the patients' due process rights by not providing them adequate notice or a hearing to challenge the transfer decision. Although the nursing
homes were extensively regulated and government Medicaid
benefits were reduced as a result of the transfer, the Court
found that the decision to transfer the Medicaid patients was
not state action. The Court stated that a government "normally can be held responsible for a private decision only
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such

126. See, e.g., Tower v. Clover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (conspiracy); Brand v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (hiring and firing).
127. For a discussion of the personal autonomy justification for the state action doctrine, see infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
128.

See L. TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1702-03.

129. 457 U.S. 991, 1004'(1982).
130. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d
Cir.) (en banc), cel. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); McDaniel
41498 (Mo.App. Oct. 30, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allstates library,
Chavous v. Brown, 396 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1990); see also Wright,
587 n.82.

218, 221 n.8 (5th
v. Mutchnick, WD
1990 WL 165952);
supra note 123, at
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significant encouragement ... that the choice must ... be
Mere approval or acquideemed to be that of the State ....
escence in the initiatives of a private party is not suffiThus, the Fifth Circuit has suggested that
cient ....
the
the mere "ministerial acts" of a judge supervising
2
empanelment process cannot constitute state action.1
In Blum, however, the decision to transfer the Medicaid
patients was not made pursuant to any statute. Thus, the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first requirement of the Lugar
two-part state action test applied by the Fifth Circuit.' 33
When a private party acts pursuant to a state statute, as a
litigant does when exercising a peremptory challenge, there is
a greater degree of state involvement and responsibility. In
such cases, there is less reason to demand significant government encouragment as a prerequisite for categorizing a private decision as state action. Moreover, when one considers
the totality of circumstances, a judge's participation in the
empanelment process is generally more than ministerial.' 34
The judge's involvement is at least as significant as the judicial involvement in Lugar'3 5 and Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc.,' 36 cases in which the Court found a private

131. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546 (1987); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
(1974).
132. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 221-22 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
133. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the Court presented
a two-part test for assaying the presence of state action. First, the claimed deprivation "must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the
State . . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who
may fairly be said to be a state actor." Id. at 937. The Fifth Circuit conceded that
a litigant's exercise of a peremptory challenge satisfies the first requirement.
Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d at 221.
134. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text. It is theoretically possible
that a judge would exercise no control over counsels' questions during voir dire
and have the court clerk supervise the peremptory challenge process. Nevertheless,
even if such facts would rebut a finding of judicial involvement in the
empanelment process, the rarity of such a confluence of events warrants the
presumption that the trial judge is more than a ministerial participant in empaneling a jury.
135. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
136. 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (probate court's appointment of an executor, activating time bar in nonclaim provisions of probate code, together with subsequent
supervision of probate proceedings, is sufficient involvement to trigger due process
requirements of fourteenth amendment).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

party's actions pursuant to state statute to be state action.
Although, the cases cited to refute a finding of state
action are unconvincing, there is a strong Supreme Court
trend toward restrictive interpretation of the state action
requirement.13 7 Nevertheless, this trend cannot justify finding a civil litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge immune from constitutional review. The Court's recent state
action cases have not involved racial discrimination claims private discrimination is now generally remedied by statute. 3' Historically, allegations of racial discrimination generally require a lesser showing of state involvement to satisfy
the state action requirement than do other fourteenth
amendment claims.'
Thus, the Court's "trend" may only
reflect a decrease in the number of cases raising racial discrimination claims. More fundamentally, scrupulous decisionmaking cannot be based merely on trends. It requires consideration of analogous precedent and reasoned policy and
principles. Given the elusive distinction between private and
public action and the Court's reliance on malleable formulaic
tests, 40 it is not surprising that relevant precedent is ambiguous. Policy considerations, however, are not. The next
section demonstrates that no recognized rationale for the
state action doctrine justifies protecting a private attorney's
discriminatory peremptory challenges from constitutional
challenge. In the absence of either controlling precedent 4 '
or a persuasive policy basis for imposing a rigorous state
action requirement, the private litigant's discriminatory per-

137. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (State university's suspension of coach to avoid NCAA sanction does not make NCAA state actor); San
Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (United
States Olympic Committee's decision to enforce exclusive right to use the word
"Olympic" not state action); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (regulated and heavily subsidized private school for
maladjusted students referred by city school committees not state actor when it
discharges employees); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (extensively regulated utility not state actor when it terminates a customer's service
without notice and hearing); see also Schneider, supra note 102, at 743 & n.29.
138. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS (78 Stat. 241) (1964) (codified in various sections of 28, 42
U.S.C.); see also Schneider, supra note 102, at 741.
139. See supra note 105.
140. See supra note 95 and notes 106-18 and accompanying text; see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at 505 & n.8.
141. See supra notes 106-36 and accompanying text.
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emptory challenge should be deemed state action.
B.

State Action Theory and Policy

The state action doctrine, by immunizing private conduct
from constitutional attack, limits the protection provided
many fundamental rights. Three primary justifications are
given to explain why infringements of our most basic liberties should be tolerated merely because the violator is a private entity rather than the government. The state action
doctrine is said to protect a sphere of individual autonomy,
honor constitutional concepts of federalism and further the
Whatever
separation of judicial and legislative powers.
the merits of these rationales generally, neither these nor
several other possible justifications for the state action doctrine can justify protecting private discrimination in the peremptory challenge process from constitutional review.
Adherence to the state action doctrine is thought to
preserve an area of individual autonomy by limiting the
reach of federal law, particularly federal judicial power. In
this sense, the state action doctrine derives from a natural
law theory of rights. 44 Certain rights are deemed so impor-

142. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); Cole,
Federal and State "State Action The UndercriticalEmbrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine,
24 GA. L. REV. 327, 345 (1990); L. TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1691; Brest, supra
note 96, at 1324; Burke & Reber, supra note 105, at 1011.
143. Several commentators have opined that the unitary state action doctrine
can never be justified. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 96; L. TRIBE, supra note
96, at 1698-1703; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 95, at 448-50.
They argue that a threshold state action determination, which focuses on the
status of the actor, is improper. Rather, the Court should openly balance the conflicting rights implicated by the underlying dispute, taking into account that the
harm created by a state's actions may be greater than the harm created by a
private actor's identical conduct.
Analysis of the merits of the state action doctrine is beyond the scope of
this essay. This article assumes the state action doctrine can be justified in the
general case, but argues that none of the proferred justifications applies in the
peremptory challenge context.
144. Natural law theory posits that individuals inherently possess certain basic
freedoms that the government may not abridge. See Chemerinsky, supra note 96,
at 528. By contrast, a positivist's theory of rights maintains that citizens possess
only those rights granted by the state. See Brest, supra note 96, at 1297; R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi-xii (1977). The state action doctrine may
be viewed as adopting a limited natural law approach because it seemingly recognizes certain inherent rights, but can preclude only judicial, not legislative, interference with those rights. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-05
(1964); Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the Constitution: In Defense of the State
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tant that they are considered immune from regulation. The
state action doctrine protects such rights not only by freeing
them from judicial control, but by protecting them even
from judicial review. For example, without a state action
doctrine, individuals might be sued for giving dinner parties
that had discriminatory guest lists. Even if the court denied
relief in such a case, having to defend such actions on the
merits would infringe the defendant's privacy interests.'
A
private party with no intention to discriminate even might
cancel her party rather than risk an erroneous judicial decision finding her conduct unconstitutional.'
The possibility
of such suits also would create serious systemic problems.
The courts would be clogged with cases asserting private
infringements of constitutional rights. Professor Marshall has
also suggested that requiring repeated balancing of constitutional rights would be inherently difficult and risk diminish47
ing the value of the non-prevailing constitutional right.1
Finding a civil litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge to be state action would not interfere with any significant personal autonomy interest. The peremptory challenge
is not an inalienable or even a constitutional right. 4 ' The
right exists only through state regulation. A party cannot
exercise the peremptory challenge until she enters the court
system, and any limitation on the peremptory challenge
would only compel conduct in that state regulated arena. In
short, any claim to a natural law right to exercise a peremp-

Action Doctrine, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 129, 134; Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at
544-45 & n.228.
145. The argument in the text presumes that the state action doctrine eliminates a greater number of suits than would a substantive rule giving dispositive
weight to the defendant's privacy interests. Despite the confusion in the state
action area, the result in certain cases, such as the one posited in the text, is
clear. The same may not be true if a balancing of constitutional rights is required.
See Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking 'Rethinking State Action", 80
Nw. L. REv. 558, 563 (1985). Ignorance of the governing standard would likely
encourage litigation. See Cole, supra note 142, at 367 & n.161. In any event, dismissal of a suit on the basis of lack of state action rescues the defendant from
having to provide a justification for his or her conduct. By freeing the defendant's
conduct from judicial scrutiny, the doctrine creates a zone of comfort that may
protect the individual's personal autonomy interest. Id. at 368-69.
146. See Cole, supra note 142, at 364-65.
147. See Marshall, supra note 145, at 564-65.
148. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
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tory challenge is nonsensical. Furthermore, a challenge to a
private party's discriminatory peremptory challenge will not
create additional lawsuits. The challenge is only raised in an
Although the challenge may involve an adexisting suit.'
ditional hearing, it does not require a full evidentiary hearing
or costly discovery. The experience in the criminal arena has
proven that the hearing required is not prohibitively expensive or time consuming. Finally, the decision on the merits
does not involve the balancing of constitutional rights feared
by Professor Marshall. The right to exercise a peremptory
challenge is only a statutory right.' 50 Moreover, in Batson
the Court already has balanced analogous competing rights
with few apparent ill-effects on the rights involved.
The state action doctrine protects federalism concerns by
preserving for states the primary role in the adjustment of
competing private interests.1 5' Historically, states and their
representatives feared federal power usurping their rights.
The allocation of decision-making authority engendered by
federalism concerns also can be justified by a desire to defer
to local expertise and avoid trivialization of the federal docket. Without the state action doctrine, many ordinary private
contract or tort disputes would become constitutional cases
subject to resolution by the federal judiciary.'5" Finally, by
deferring to state decision making in the first instance, the
states may act as laboratories for experimentation with new
rules and approaches.
Initially, one may question the contemporary strength of
the federalism justification. It is now Widely recognized that
Congress has broad powers to legislate in areas historically
left to the states.' 53 Although there is reason to accept congressional, but not judicial, power to override state control of
private behavior, this raises primarily separation of power,

149. A juror suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be barred by
judicial or attorney immunity. Cf Imbler v. Pachitman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976)
(prosecutorial immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (judicial immunity). No such suit has been reported following Batson.
150. See supra note 148.
151. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883); Cole, supra note 142, at
358.
152. See Cole, supra note 142, at 358-59.
153. See, e.g., id. at 360-61; Schwarzschild, supra note 144, at 134 & n.25;
Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at 543-45.
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not federalism, interests."14 Moreover, the zone of state autonomy that the state action doctrine creates exists only for
state inaction. Once the state has spoken, either through
statute or judicial decision, there is state action that may be
reviewed by the federal judiciary.'5 5 This seems to place an
artificial importance on the status quo.
In any event, the interests the federalism justification is
thought to advance are not furthered in the peremptory
challenge context. A federal decision applying Batson to civil
trials would not trample state's rights. First, there is no question that the federal judiciary can control the conduct of the
peremptory challenge process in their own courts. This does
not usurp any state function. Although state courts would be
bound by a federal constitutional pronouncement, the federal
courts would not be acting in an area in which they lack
expertise. With diversity jurisdiction, they repeatedly hear
civil cases raising state claims. And in both federal and state
cases, the federal courts are aware of the importance of peremptory challenges and equal protection rights. There is no
reason to believe the federal courts are incapable of balancing the private rights involved. Indeed, they would be balancing the identical rights when determining if Batson should
apply to civil trials in federal court. Moreover, state courts
would have substantial control over the implementation of
the federal rule. Accordingly, they would be able to respond
to local conditions in effectuating the Batson guidelines. Recognizing a Batson right to be free from discriminatory peremptory challenges in civil trials would not trivialize the federal docket. Such challenges typically do not raise independent claims. 56 Batson hearings in state cases would remain
in state courts. Finally, there is no reason to defer to state
decision-making to gain experience with different approaches.
Such experimentation has already occurred in pre-Batson
criminal trials and through application of state constitutional
provisions in post-Batson civil trials.
The state action doctrine serves a separation of powers
function by allocating to state legislatures or the Congress

154. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the separation of powers justification for the state action doctrine.
155. See L. TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1688-89.
156. See supra note 149.
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the initial duty to define how private disputes should be
resolved. Leaving the ordering of private relationships to the
legislative branch may be justified on several grounds. The
legislature, elected by and answerable to the public, better
expresses the majoritarian view. The legislature often has
greater institutional competence, including better information
gathering ability.157 Legislative enactment also provides flexibility. If a legislative rule proves unsatisfactory, it may be
repealed or, in appropriate circumstances, invalidated by the
courts. On the other hand, a constitutional decision places
serious restraints on the ability of both legislatures and the
common law to adjust to changing circumstances." 8 Finally,
legislative, as opposed to judicial, decision-making provides a
valuable notice-giving function which protects the individual's
sphere of personal autonomy. 5 9 A citizen knows in advance what conduct is proscribed and therefore may freely
exercise their legitimate liberty interests.
None of these rationales, however, justifies shielding a
civil litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge from judicial review. Even if a legislature best voices majoritarian concerns, the judiciary cannot abdicate its obligation to review
equal protection claims. A constitutional right, particularly
the right to equal protection, is part of the Constitution
6
precisely to guard against majoritarian excesses. 1 In any
event, Congress has already expressed its intent to maintain
a jury process free from discrimination. Section 1861 of 28
U.S.C., addressing formation of the jury venire, provides:
"No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petite juror in the district courts of the United States .

.

. on

account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 6 ' A court applying Batson to civil trials would
not be usurping any legislative function, but would be furthering broadly read congressional intent. Alternatively, the
Court could be viewed as formulating procedural rules to
preserve judicial integrity, a function the Court, through its
supervisory powers, has previously reserved to itself.'62 Ad157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See
See
See
See
See

Cole, supra note 142, at 379.
Marshall, supra note 145, at 566-67.
Cole, supra note 142, at 364-65.
Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at 546 & n.236.
The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1862

(1988).
162. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); cf. Clark v. City of
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ditionally, the peremptory challenge process is an area peculiarly within judicial expertise and a constitutional decision
would not create troubling inflexibility in the law. The courts
have observed pre- and post-Batson behavior for years. They
have had more than enough experience to appropriately
balance the competing peremptory challenge and equal protection rights. Finally, legislative notice that Batson would be
applicable to civil trials is unnecessary. Litigants do not face
independent suits, much less damage claims, for discriminatory peremptory challenges. The litigant does not have to fear
liability for the exercise of any legitimate liberty interest.
Professor Schwarzschild offers an interesting alternative
to the traditional justifications for the state action doctrine.
He suggests that the state action doctrine is justified because
it promotes "value pluralism." 6 ' He reasons that society derives maximum satisfaction when there are many and conflicting values from which each individual may choose. 64
When the state, a monopoly institution, adopts its own policy, there can be no pluralism. Citizens have no choice but to
submit to the government policy. In such circumstances, the
Constitution appropriately requires review of the
government's policy decision. In contrast, when a private party acts (or the government vindicates a private choice), "the
citizen may potentially enjoy an array of possible choices." "65
' If the choices available are deemed unsatisfactory,
the legislature may enact the will of the majority.'66 But
when choices are available, there should be no constitutional
bar to diverse persons pursuing diverse values. 6 7 In effect,
the state action doctrine creates a presumption of limited
harm when there is an "exit option" available to the victim
of a private party's conduct.
At most, Professor Schwarzschild provides a justification
for a state action doctrine. As Professor Schwarzschild recognizes, it does not describe the existing state action test. 6

Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 897 (D. Conn. 1986) (using supervisory powers to
preclude white litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge in civil trial).
163. See Schwarzschild, supra note 145, at 132.
164. Id. at 132, 137-38.
165. Id. at 145.
166. See i. at 137.
167. I& at 138.
168. i at 142, 145. The value pluralism conception of the state action doc-
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On a theoretical level, one also may question whether value
pluralism should be the sole governing standard. Often one
person's freedom to choose may preclude another person's
choice. For example, a restaurant owner may choose to discriminate when deciding whom she wishes to serve. The victim of the discrimination may dine elsewhere, but once refused service, can no longer choose to live in a world free
from discrimination and the stigma such discrimination creates. It is no answer to suggest that the legislature may remedy such conflicts. As suggested earlier, this ignores the
judiciary's constitutional role to protect minority interests. "6' 9 As a practical matter, the value pluralism model
appears to suffer from the same indeterminacy afflicting the
current standard. For example, Professor Schwarzschild acknowledges that strict application of his model in Shelley v.
Kraemer'70 would have required enforcement of the racially
restrictive covenant.' 7' Yet, because he views that outcome
as intolerable, Professor Schwarzschild offers an argument
under his model to justify reaching the same result as the
Court.'7 2 Such malleability precludes meaningful predictability. Similarly, Professor Schwarzschild offers no standard with
which to measure how satisfactory the "exit option" must be
to avoid categorization as state action. For example, why isn't
the citizen's option to move to a different state as satisfactory (and realistic) as the worker's option to change jobs if he
or she experiences discrimination in the workplace? In any
event, even if value pluralism is the applicable standard, a
civil litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge should be
treated as state action. The state is a monopolist in the jury
empanelment process. A juror who is a potential victim of
discrimination cannot choose to avoid it. The state summons
the juror and assigns him or her to designated panels. The
juror has no choice in the matter.
One might submit that even if all justifications for the
state action doctrine appear inapplicable in the peremptory
challenge context, simple administrative efficiency counsels
trine, however, does explain the Court's emphasis on the "exclusivity" of a private
party's public function. See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1978).
169. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
170. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
171. See Schwarzschild, supra note 145, at 155.
172. Id. at 155-60.
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for strict application of the doctrine, rather than case by case
consideration of state action policies. This argument misconstrues the thesis of this essay. This article does not recommend abandonment of a unitary state action doctrine.' 3
Rather, it merely suggests that, as in all areas of the law,
underlying policies provide standards with which to resolve
difficult cases.'7 4 Analysis of facts without standards results
in unprincipled decision-making.
In sum, there is a strong factual argument for considering a civil litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge to
be state action.'7 5 Case law is ambiguous, 76 but the policies underlying the state action doctrine unequivocably fail to
justify an immunity from judicial review. Accordingly, a civil
litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge should be
judged state action.
C. Applying Equal Protection Analysis to the Exercise of
Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges in Civil Trials
If the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment can be satisfied, it is necessary to address whether
Batson's equal protection analysis should apply equally to civil
litigation.'7 7 Cases that have addressed this question are
most notable for their lack of reasoning. Courts that have

173. See Chemerinsky, supra note 96.
174. See Burke & Reber, supra note 105, at 1012.
175. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 106-36 and accompanying text. In Batson, five justices
declined to address whether the Court's holding applied to defense counsel.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986). This suggests that those justices
believed there is at least an arguable case for finding state action in a private
attorney's discriminatory peremptory challenge. Two other justices positively assumed that defense counsel's peremptory challenges would be considered state action. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring), at
125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
177. The applicability of Batson's equal protection balance to the civil setting
merits attention even if one concludes that a civil litigant's peremptory challenge
does not constitute state action. All courts that have faced the issue have agreed
that at least a government attorney's discriminatory peremptory challenge in civil
litigation constitutes state action. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893
F.2d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 1990), petition for ceil. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 2418 (Jan. 12,
1990); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 895 & n.6 (D. Conn. 1986);
see also Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 222 n.10 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cen. granted, I11 S. Ct. 41 (1990). Moreover, the same equal protection
balance may be relevant to application of state constitutional provisions or the
court's supervisory powers. See supra note 91.
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rejected the application of Batson have generally relied on
the inherent differences between civil and criminal trials
78
without explaining the relevance of those differences.
Courts that have applied Batson to civil trials, on the other
hand, ignore those differences and merely state, without
analysis, that the fourteenth
amendment applies equally to
17 9
cases.
criminal
and
civil
Unquestionably, there are manifest differences between
civil and criminal proceedings. For example, the burden of
proof, the number of peremptory challenges allowed each
litigant, and the right to a jury in civil and criminal trials are
different. Whether these or the myriad other differences
between civil and criminal proceedings should influence the
applicability of Batson to civil litigation requires a reconsideration of the balance of interests inherent in Batson.
In Batson, the Court balanced three primary interests:
elimination of discrimination in the jury selection process,
preservation of the historic function of the peremptory chal18 0
lenge, and avoidance of serious administrative burdens.
The Court identified three justifications for eliminating discriminatory peremptory challenges. Limiting the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges (1) vindicates the equal protection right of the defendant, (2) protects the juror's right to
serve on a jury and (3) furthers the community's interest in
maintaining confidence and a voice in the judicial process.'
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged the
178. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp.
760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986); see also Note, supra note 3, 15 Am J. Crim. Law at
300-01; Note, supra note 3, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. at 163. Several cases rejecting
application of Batson to civil trials exclusively relied upon the absence of state
action. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Mutchnick, WD 41498 (Mo.App. Oct. 30, 1990)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library, 1990 WL 165952); Texas Health Enter., Inc. v.
Tolden, 795 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.App. 1990); Chavous v. Brown, 396 S.E.2d 98 (S.C.
1990). They did not even address the differences between civil and criminal trials.
179. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 2418 Uan 12, 1990) (No. 88-2540); Fludd v.
Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 829 (lth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, sub nom. Tiller v. Fludd,
110 S. Ct. 201 (1989); Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 689-90 (N.D.
Ill.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir.
1988); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Conn. 1986); Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So.2d 343, 345 (Ala. 1989).
180. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 99-100.
181. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. In Holland, the Court subsequently suggested that the latter two interests alone should support Batson limita-
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historic importance of the peremptory challenge.8 2 The
challenge can limit both actual and perceived partiality on
the jury. The challenge permits a party to excuse a potential
juror who perhaps should have been excused for cause, who
has been offended by counsel's voir dire questions, or who
just does not "sit right" with the litigant.'
The Court, of
course, held that the harm from discrimination as a result of
an unfettered exercise of the peremptory challenge right
outweighed both the injury to the historic peremptory challenge right and the administrative costs resulting from limited review of peremptory challenges.
To determine whether the differences between civil and
criminal trials affect this balance, this article defines a socalled "Batson function":
BF

=

(d)(x) + (p)(y) + (a)(z) where

d = Harm from Discrimination
p

=

Harm from Partiality

a = Administrative Costs 4 and
x, y & z are coefficients such that x > y> z to reflect the
relative importance of the three respective interests.
This function serves as a theoretical model of the balance of
interests inherent in Batson. The objective, of course, is to
keep the Batson function as low as possible, i.e., to minimize
the harms from discrimination and partiality and to lower
administrative costs. Batson itself illustrates the function's
application. In effect, the Batson Court imposed limitations
on the prosecutor's exercise of his peremptory challenge
right because judicial review lowered the "Batson
function."8 5 Review reduced 8 6 the amount of discrimina-

tions on the peremptory challenge. See supra note 85.
182. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 98.
183. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
184. Administrative costs include the cost of a Batson hearing as well as the
costs from potentially increased voir dire or appeals. This article also considers
any effect on the respect for or efficient functioning of the judicial system as an
administrative cost.
185. In equal protection terms, discriminatory peremptory challenges could not
survive the strict scrutiny standard of review. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 95, at 530-31. The Court, in effect, found that because limited
review of discriminatory challenges had a net positive effect for society, the gov-
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tion and increased administrative costs and the degree of
8 7 The Batson function was lowered
partiality on the jury."
because, in the Court's view, the decrease in the harm from
discrimination, when multiplied by the abstract coefficient x
that reflects the importance of an anti-discrimination policy
to our society, 188 exceeded the increase in (p)(y) + (a)(z).
Quantification of the variables, much less the coefficients, in the Batson function is, of course, impossible. Nevertheless, use of this function serves to focus the analysis. If
ABF'8 9 in civil trials does not significantly differ from ABF

ernment did not have a compelling interest in tle unfettered exercise of the
peremptory challenge right. If the alleged discriminatory challenge had excluded
non-suspect group members, the government would have needed to show only a
rational basis for not reviewing the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. Under that
lower standard of review, the Court undoubtedly would have deferred to the
government's determination of the benefits of an unfettered peremptory challenge
right. Id. at 530. This clarifies why Batson should not require a litigant to explain
the litigant's systematic elimination of all engineers, poets, poor people, or jurors
wearing black shoes and white sox (although some view the latter group as suspect) from the jury. Fear that a "cross-section of the community" analysis would
require review of challenges striking members of such non-suspect groups may
also explain why the Court rejected petitioner's sixth amendment claim in Holland
v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 809 & n.2 (1990).
186. Batson does not eliminate discrimination in the peremptory challenge process because of difficulties of proof and some courts' hostility to the Batson rule.
See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
187. The increase in partiality includes primarily the actual and perceived bias
of jurors for whose exclusion the prosecutor cannot provide a neutral reason. Jury
partiality also may increase if the requirement that the prosecutor justify facially
discriminatory challenges chills the prosecutor's exercise of her peremptory challenge right. Finally, mandating that the prosecutor provide reasons for discriminatory peremptory challenges requires the court to "traffic" in prejudices that
would otherwise go unexplored. See Babcock, supra note 9, at 553. Because the
partiality variable is a proxy for the value of the peremptory challenge, this too
will be deemed to increase the harm from partiality.
188. There are two additional reasons to weigh the degree of discrimination
more than the degree of partiality. Both variables include harm resulting from the
perception of unfairness. If the peremptory challenge right is limited a litigant
may view the randomly selected jury as being partial and feel helpless to cure that
defect. Nevertheless, the perception of unfairness that results from random selection arguably is less than that which arises from the deliberate and systematic
exlusion of minority jurors. Jury discrimination also potentially affects a wider audience. Jurors, litigants and the community observe and are affected by discrimination in the jury selection process. Ostensibly, only the litigant is harmed by an
increase in partiality (falling short of that necessary for a challenge for cause)
resulting from limitations on the peremptory challenge. But see Babcock, supra
note 9, at 552.
189. ABF is defined as (BF without Batson procedures) minus (BF with Batson
procedures). It represents the degree to which imposing Batson procedures im-
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in criminal trials, than Batson should apply in the civil setting. Accordingly, the following paragraphs address seriatim
the effects on the Batson function of the most significant
differences between civil and criminal trials.
Courts rejecting application of Batson to civil trials emphasize that the accused in a criminal trial has greater rights
and typically more at stake than the litigant in a civil proceeding.'
This would seem to lower the benefits of Batson
procedures in civil relative to criminal trials. That is, ABF
would be lower in civil cases because the reduction in harm
from discrimination (and the change in (d)(x)) would be less
in civil compared to criminal cases. The harm from discrimination is undoubtedly greater when it contributes to a minority member's loss of freedom. Nevertheless, many civil trials involve interests that are at least as significant as some
criminal trials. A civil litigant has more at stake in a
multi-million dollar civil lawsuit than a criminal defendant in
a misdemeanor action punishable by only a small fine. More
fundamentally, Batson apparently applies even if the criminal
defendant suffers no harm from discrimination. In Holland,
five justices opined that a non-minority criminal defendant
was entitled to Batson's protections based on third party
standing.'' If an effect on the defendant's interests is unnecessary for application of Batson, the strength of those
interests cannot be a relevant distinction between criminal
and civil cases. Juror and community interests alone support
application of Batson, and those interests are not significantly
different in criminal and civil trials.19 When the civil liti-

proves the Batson function (i.e., lowers harms and costs).
190. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F.
Supp. 760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986).
191. See supra note 85. This article does not suggest that a non-minority defendant is never personally harmed when minorities are excluded from the jury.
For example a white civil rights worker may have as much interest as a minority
defendant, in maintaining minority representation on the jury. Nevertheless, Ho!land suggests that Batson can apply even if no such interest exists.
192. The special protections afforded the accused, however, may argue against
imposing Batson limitations on the exercise of the criminal defendant's peremptory
challenge right. By increasing the relative harm from partiality, application of
Batson's requirements to defense counsel would produce a lower ABF than results
from similar application to the prosecution. A full analysis of Batson's application
to peremptory challenges by the criminal defendant is beyond the scope of this
article. But see Goldwasser, supra note 52.
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gant is a minority group member, ABF even may be greater
than in a criminal case in which the defendant does not personally suffer from discrimination.
In criminal trials the state must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Society prefers an erroneous acquittal to
an improper conviction. Civil trials, on the other hand, are
governed by the lesser preponderance standard. The public
does not want to favor one civil litigant over another. Arguably, this suggests that the increase in partiality from Batson
procedures is more significant (and hence ABF is less) in civil
than in criminal trials. This argument, however, is only a
repackaged version of the "defendant has greater rights"
argument rejected above. The burden of proof is imposed to
protect the defendant's special interests, not because the
public believes the prosecution should be disfavored.19 Indeed, absent the accused's interest, society would probably
prefer to have a civil litigant, rather than a government prosecutor, improperly lose. The public does not want guilty
criminal defendants to roam the streets. Thus, the harm
from increased partiality under Batson actually may be greater in criminal, rather than civil cases, and therefore ABF
even may be greater in the civil setting.
The prosecutor's goal is justice. The civil litigant is an
advocate whose first aim is to win. This, according to the
Fifth Circuit, justifies the civil litigant's "rational discrimination" and ostensibly increases the harm from partiality created by imposing Batson procedures in civil trials.194 To the
extent the Fifth Circuit relies on the value of "rational discrimination," it ignores the teaching of Batson. The Batson
Court did not question whether certain generalizations might
be crude approximations for juror bias. Rather, it held that
approval of exclusions based on such generalizations would
undermine the "core guarantee of equal protection."91 5 Stereotypical assumptions based on race are insufficiently tailored to be cognizable as anything but purposeful discrimination. Arguably, the Court might impose the costs of eliminat193. If the accused's rights were not the primary justification for the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, the government also would face a heavier burden of
proof in civil trials.
194. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225-26 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cet. granted, I1IS. Ct. 41 (1990).
195. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

ing "rational discrimination" on the state, but not a private
litigant. When the government is held to a higher standard,
all of society shares the costs associated with the aspirational
goal of colorblindness. A civil litigant, perhaps, should not be
forced to shoulder the entire burden of society's aspirations.
Private citizens, however, often are required to bear an additional burden when their interests conflict with this country's
aspirations for a colorblind society. 9 For example, the
prospect that white children's education would be temporarily disrupted by a desegregation order did not prevent the
Court from ordering such relief in Brown v. Board of Education. ' 7 Similarly, a business owner cannot refuse employment to minority members merely because his customers
prefer to be served by white workers. 9 There is no reason
a civil litigant, when exercising race-based peremptory challenges, should be treated differently. In fact, society may be
more willing to impose aspirational costs on civil litigants,
whose primary interest is economic, than on the government,
whose interests include society's safety. The civil litigant's
interest in winning, however, may have an impact on the
extent Batson procedures reduce discrimination. Unconstrained by a standard of justice, the civil litigant may more
aggressively seek to exploit the loopholes in the Batson deci-

196. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3025-26 (1990)
("[als part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent
persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy"); see also
Strauss, supra note 20, at 100-05; Cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)
("the reality of private biases and the possible injury they may inflict" cannot
justify consideration of race in child custody dispute). The Court, however, might
view costs associated with the aspirational goal of colorblindness as too great to
bear when an individual's freedom is at stake. This would be an additional reason
to refuse to apply Batson to criminal defense counsel. See Goldwasser, supra note
52, at 834-38; see also supra note 190.
197. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Of course, the Court has imposed some limits on
the costs that private citizens must bear to achieve society's goal of colorblindness.
For example, the Court has disapproved quotas as a means of remedying societal
discrimination. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Court's
primary concern, however, is the imposition of costs on innocent bystanders. See
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986); Regents of the Univ.
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-08 (1978). The litigant guilty of discriminatory peremptory challenges does not have such status.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1981); cf Katzenbach v. Gulf-State Theaters, Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 549, 552 (1966) (under Civil Rights Act of 1964, theater owner may
not refuse admission to black patrons even if presence of blacks offend white
customers upon whose support the business depends).
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sion. For example, they may more often "manufacture"
race-neutral reasons to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. By decreasing the ability to prove discrimination, this
would lower ABF in civil relative to criminal cases. Advocate
or not, every litigant has an obligation to act in good faith
and with respect for the -law. Even if civil litigants ignored
these obligations more frequently than prosecutors, basing
constitutional decisions on anticipated ethical failings has
dubious merit. The overzealous civil litigant's possible effect
on ABF should be ignored.
In a criminal suit, the prosecutor represents the state.
When she discriminates against an individual, the discrimination carries the imprimatur of the state and therefore results in greater juror stigmatization and injury to judicial integrity than when a civil litigant discriminates."' This, of
course, is the state action issue revisited. Still, it is not
enough to say that this article has already provided a principled basis for finding a civil litigant's race-based peremptory
challenge to be state action. The state's involvement with
challenged behavior and the harm it may create constitutes a
continuum. A minority member suffers far greater injury
when the President of the United States uses a racial epithet
than when an IRS clerk employs a similar derogatory term.
Nevertheless, juror stigmatization and injury to judicial integrity (and community respect for the judicial process) results
from perceptions, not the fact, of state involvement. And
jurors and the community will often perceive a civil litigant's
discriminatory peremptory challenge to be as much the responsibility of the state as a prosecutor's race-based peremptory. In civil trials, the judge presides over voir dire, often
asks the jurors questions, and supervises virtually all the proceedings in the government courtroom. The judge rules on
all challenges for cause. When the civil litigant exercises her
peremptory challenge, it is the court, usually the judge, that
excuses the juror. Whether the law recognizes judicial inaction as state action or not, much of the public perceives
judicial acquiescence as judicial approval. Furthermore, most
jurors will not be familiar with a state prosecutor's code of
ethics and the prosecutor's obligation to further justice, as

199. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. grante4 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
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opposed to merely win. Thus, jurors may perceive prosecutors as advocates, just like civil litigants. Finally, in some
jurisdictions, challenges are made and ruled upon outside the
presence of the jury. Jurors may not know who is responsible
for their exclusion. Accordingly, they cannot ascribe greater
state involvement to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge
than to any other litigant's challenge. 0 In sum, perceptions, not actualities, determine the effect on ABF of disparate degrees of state involvement and the perception of state
involvement in civil cases will often be just as great as in
criminal cases. 20 ' Many will view the judicial system, not the
conduct of individual litigants, as discriminatory.
Justice White, concurring in Batson, suggested that a
prosecutor's inability to justify a peremptory challenge implies a belief that blacks cannot fairly try black defendants or
are incapable of serving as jurors.202 "This, in effect, attributes to the prosecutor the view that all blacks should be
eliminated from the entire venire."20 - When a civil litigant
exercises a peremptory challenge, arguably her discrimination
affects only a single trial. This suggests that the prosecutor's
challenge creates greater harm to the community's interest in
maintaining minority representation in the judicial system
and more severely stigmatizes minority jurors. It follows that
applying Batson procedures in criminal trials would result in

200. One might posit the question, "why shouldn't the remedy be a judicial instruction explaining the nature of peremptory challenges, rather than imposition
of Batson procedures?" Suppose the judge stated to the jury: "Counsel is allotted
three peremptory challenges to exclude jurors that they prefer not be on the jury
for any reason whatsoever. No explanation is required for the challenge and the
individual litigant is solely responsible for the decision to exclude. Even if I ask
you to leave the jury box, do not assume that I agree with or approve of
counsel's decision to exclude any particular juror or series of jurors." Would this
really change juror perceptions? The natural reaction to a series of discriminatory
challenges would still be "why don't you [the judge] do something about it," or
worse yet, a passivist acceptance that the judicial system just is not designed to
protect minority interests.
201. This essay acknowledges that some jurors will perceive greater state involvement when a prosecutor, as opposed to a civil litigant, discriminates. Nevertheless, in many, probably most, cases juror perceptions will be identical and
therefore a presumption that the perception of state involvement is greater in
criminal as compared to civil trials is misplaced (or at least vastly overbroad).
202. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., concurring);
see also Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert.
grante4 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
203. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
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a greater ABF than in civil trials. Justice White's premise
ignores rational discrimination. Prosecutors' exercise of
race-based peremptory challenges does not necessarily imply
a view that black jurors are inferior and should never serve
on the venire. Rather, it may reflect the belief that minority
members likely are not the most sympathetic jurors for a
particular government case. In any event, well known generalizations about minority groups exist in the civil setting and
therefore also create a substantial risk that such minority
groups may face ongoing, rather than isolated, discrimination
with its attendant greater injury.
In civil trials, the party whose peremptory challenge is
questioned, unlike the prosecutor, has a personal stake in the
20 4
litigation that may justify "personal dislike" peremptories.
It is important that the civil litigant feel like they are being
treated fairly. Restricting the civil litigant's peremptory challenge right, therefore, may create harm from perceived partiality that is not incurred when the prosecutor's peremptories
are similarly limited. This concern with the perception of
partiality suggests application of Batson in civil proceedings
may produce a greater increase in the harm from partiality
and hence a lower ABF than in criminal trials. The largest
component of the litigant's perception of unfairness probably
results from the litigant's inability to "rationally discriminate." 2°5 It may be inappropriate, however, to give much
weight to that harm given the Court's holding in Batson that
"rational discrimination" cannot rebut an inference of purposeful discrimination. 2 6 Additionally, the litigant remains
free under Batson to discriminate rationally against non-suspect groups.20 7 A less significant source of a litigant's perception of unfairness, improper Batson findings, may be mitigated somewhat by the availability of appellate, albeit very
deferential, review. In any event, a concern about the perception of unfairness is only a fractional component of the harm
from the partiality variable. That variable is most concerned

204. See Goldwasser, supra note 52, at 829-31. The "personal dislike" peremp.
tory preserves the perception, if not the reality, of juror neutrality.
205. See supra note 20.
206. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 97; see also supra text accompanying notes
59-63. Of course, if the litigant's complaint is the inability to exercise her irrational prejudices, her interest is entitled to even less, if any, weight.

207. See supra note 185.
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with an increase in actual partiality. The civil litigant's "personal stake" does not affect the harm from actual partiality.
Finally, even if the civil litigant's "personal stake" in the peremptory challenge marginally lowers ABF in civil relative to
criminal trials, this decrease should be offset by the increase
in ABF from those cases in which the opposing civil litigant
has a personal stake (that criminal defendants, after Holland,
do not need to have) in preventing discrimination. °s
Counsel for civil litigants, unlike government prosecutors, consult with their clients and have established
attorney-client relationships. One commentator has suggested
that requiring private counsel to justify their peremptory
challenges may require disclosure of communications protected by the attorney-client privilege. 0 9 This may be viewed as
increasing administrative costs (or the harm from partiality if
counsel's peremptory challenge right is chilled) and hence reducing ABF in civil relative to criminal trials. The possibility
that Batson's application to civil trials will require counsel to
breach the attorney-client privilege does not seem to be a
serious problem. Hearings that require disclosure of
attorney-client communications can be, and sometimes are,
ex parte. 1 0 Moreover, litigants frequently must explain
challenges for cause. Disclosure of privileged conversations
has not proven to be a major dilemma in that setting or in
state courts that have required Batson-like procedures in civil
trials under state constitutional provisions. Any effect on
ABF, at most, should be de minimis.
One court, rejecting application of Batson to a civil trial,
emphasized that a criminal defendant, unlike a civil plaintiff,

208. See supra text accompanying note 192. If, contrary to this article, a court
views a litigant's "personal stake" in the peremptory challenge as significantly increasing the harm from partiality variable in civil relative to criminal trials, the
court could limit Batson's application to civil trials in which the litigant raising the
Batson claim shares the same race as the challenged juror.
209. See Goldwasser, supra note 52, at 831-33.
210. See Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for
Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE LJ. 187 (1989). This article does not endorse
ex parte Batson hearings as a general matter. Rather, it merely observes that
Batson hearings in some cases are already conducted outside the presence of

opposing counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 338-40 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Bell v. United States, 488 U.S. 855 (1988); United
denied, 483 U.S. 1007
States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1200-02 (6th Cir.), cert.

(1987).
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is "haled into court against his will."2 ' Civil plaintiffs, however, do not choose to be injured and forced to go to court
to receive compensation. Moreover, civil defendants are also
haled into court involuntarily. It seems untenable to grant
them Batson rights yet deprive civil plaintiffs, equals before
the court, of equivalent rights. It might be argued that civil
plaintiffs should be treated differently because they choose
the forum and therefore can select a venue with a large minority population. That would lower the risk that they would
be harmed by discrimination and hence, decrease ABF. This
assumes, however, that the harm from discrimination is primarily concerned with the party's, as opposed to the jurors'
and community's, equal protection interests. Holland has
placed that assumption in doubt. In any event, personal jurisdiction and venue requirements restrict a plaintiffs ability to
select a forum based on the jurisdiction's minority population.
The right to a jury trial is different in civil and criminal
trials. Criminal cases are required to be tried by a jury unless
the defendant waives the jury trial right in writing and with
the approval of the court. 12 In civil cases, the parties often
do not have a right to a jury. 3 When a jury right exists,
the litigant must timely demand a jury trial or that right will
be waived." 4 The greater right to a jury might suggest that
the criminal defendant has a greater interest in maintaining
minority representation in the jury process and hence a
greater interest in limiting discrimination. Following Holland,
however, the defendant's interest in avoiding discrimination
can no longer support differential treatment between civil
and criminal trials.2"5 The remaining BF variables do not
appear to be influenced by the difference in jury trial rights.
Once a jury is requested, its function is similar in civil and
criminal cases.21 6

211. Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986).
212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
213. The seventh amendment preserves the right to a jury trial only as it existed at common law. Purely equitable claims are not entitled to jury determinations. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1830); see also Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
214. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
215.

See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.

216. See Note, supra note 3, 40 RUTGERs L. REV. at 946-49.
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Criminal trials frequently involve more volatile issues
than civil trials. Accordingly, it may be more important that
the community perceive criminal proceedings as fair. Therefore, requiring Batson procedures in criminal trials arguably
has a greater impact on ABF than would application of
Batson to civil trials. Civil litigation, however, often involves
the same, and equally volatile, issues as criminal matters. For
example, when a white police officer shoots an
African-American teenager, a civil rights 21 or wrongful
death action may engender as much publicity and community
interest as a criminal prosecution. Additionally, Batson applies
to criminal cases even if they completely lack notoriety. Finally, much of the public does not distinguish between criminal
and civil cases. They perceive the judicial system, not criminal or civil litigation, as fair or unfair. Thus, the interest in
maintaining community respect for the judicial process may
not be significantly different in, and should not justify disparate treatment between, criminal and civil trials.
The Fifth Circuit has suggested that civil and criminal
trials differ because the criminal jury, through the double
jeopardy clause, has the de facto power to pardon. 1 Because the criminal jury has greater power to protect the accused, the court apparently believed that the harm from
discrimination in civil proceedings is less than in criminal
trials. Holland undermines the court's reasoning. Batson may
apply even if the accused suffers no injury whatsoever from
the alleged discrimination. Nevertheless, the jury's greater
power may have a small effect on the community's interest
in maintaining a voice in and respect for the judicial system.
In criminal trials, unlike civil proceedings, the community's
voice is the last word, at least if the jury acquits. Protecting
the community's interest against discrimination, therefore,
potentially increases ABF in criminal compared to civil trials.
On the other hand, the ability of a civil litigant to appeal an
improper verdict reduces the potential harm from partiality
under Batson and therefore increases ABF. This should at
least offset the decrease in ABF caused by the fractional
increase in the harm from discrimination.

217. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
218. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
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The number of peremptory challenges allotted litigants
in civil and criminal trials typically is disparate.2 1 q This potentially affects several of the BF variables. With fewer
peremptories, the civil litigant cannot cause as much harm
from .discrimination. Detection of discrimination also becomes more difficult. Thus, Batson's requirements should
produce reduced benefits when there are fewer peremptory
challenges allotted each party. On the other hand, imposing
Batson procedures would have a lesser impact on jury partiality. Fewer peremptories means greater difficulty establishing a
prima facie case, and therefore less interference with the
litigant's peremptory challenge right. The decision to allot
fewer peremptories to civil litigants also suggests that the
government is not as concerned with partiality in civil cases.
In effect, the coefficient "y" may be less in civil relative to
criminal cases. Finally, the increase in administrative costs
under a Batson rule would be less in civil trials. With fewer
peremptories and the greater difficulty establishing a prima
facie case, there should be fewer Batson hearings requested,
and when a Batson claim is raised, fewer challenges will have
to be justified. The net effect on ABF is indeterminate. Although the benefits from imposing Batson requirements on
the civil litigant would be less, the harms it would create
would also be less. It may be that the fewer number of
peremptories in civil trials affects the variables in BF proportionally and therefore does not significantly affect ABF. In
any event, the substantial overlap that exists among civil and
criminal peremptory challenge allotments undermines the
significance of this difference between criminal and civil trials. The federal courts and more than half the states provide
for a greater or equal number of peremptory challenges in
civil trials than in criminal misdemeanor cases.220 If the
Court has not limited application of Batson to capital and
other felony cases, the number of peremptories permitted by
statute in civil trials should not preclude Batson's application
in the civil setting.
In civil trials, the jury size is often smaller and non-unanimous verdicts are more frequent than in criminal proceedings. A smaller jury potentially affects ABF. A minority

219. See supra note 11.
220. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 282-84.
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member that remains on the jury will have a potentially
greater influence on the verdict. Consequently, the juror's
discriminatory exclusion may result in a greater harm from
discrimination. On the other hand, with fewer challenges
necessary to impact the jury composition, the excluded jurors
may not perceive a challenge as discriminatory and hence
may suffer less stigmatization because of the smaller jury
size. " ' For similar reasons, Batson's success in reducing the
harm from discrimination may also be less when there is a
smaller jury. A litigant may be able to eliminate an entire
segment of the community from the jury without triggering a
Batson hearing. Of course, this also suggests that the administrative costs under a Batson rule in civil cases would be less
than in criminal cases. The greater relative influence of a
single juror also increases the harm from partiality resulting
from application of Batson procedures. Again, the net result
of these various effects on ABF is indeterminate. Requiring
less than a unanimous verdict potentially increases ABF (and
hence favors application of Batson in civil cases). When a
non-unanimous verdict is permissible, there is less harm if a
partial juror remains on the jury. Accordingly, (p)(y) is not as
great when Batson procedures are required in jurisdictions
permitting non-unanimous verdicts. Batson's effect on harm
from discrimination (A(d)(x)) would seem to be less for much
the same reason. In criminal trials, however, Holland suggests
that Batson applies even if the alleged discrimination has no
effect on the jury's verdict. Whether the verdict must be
unanimous does not appear to significantly affect the juror
and community injury components of the harm from the
discrimination variable. Thus, the smaller increase in the
harm from partiality in civil compared to criminal trials may
not be offset by a corresponding smaller reduction in the
harm from discrimination. In any event, the greater likelihood of twelve member juries and unanimous verdicts in
criminal proceedings should not justify application of Batson
in criminal, but not civil, cases. Some criminal cases permit
non-unanimous verdicts or less than twelve member juries.
Conversely, numerous civil cases do have twelve member

221. The community also may not perceive the civil litigant's challenges as
discriminatory and therefore the community's confidence in the judicial system
may not be affected by the alleged discrimination.
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juries and require unanimous verdicts. 2 As with the number of peremptory challenges allotted, juror size and unanimity of verdict requirements are independently identifiable and
do not necessarily coincide with whether the case is a civil or
criminal matter. A civil/criminal dichotomy to isolate the
effects of jury size and unanimity of verdict on &BF would
be unreasonably under- and over-inclusive.
The parties' interests in delay are different in criminal
and civil cases. The prosecutor and the accused typically want
to settle or move the case to trial. By contrast, defendants in
civil cases often will want to postpone the proceedings. Accordingly, application of Batson to civil cases may encourage
discrimination. Hearings, further voir dire and empaneling of
a new jury all delay the action. There is no question that an
increased incentive for delay in civil cases could increase the
harm from discrimination and the administration costs resulting from imposition of Batson procedures. Nevertheless, the
proper cure is not a rejection of Batson, but an adjustment
of the remedy upon finding a Batson violation. The court can
reduce the number of peremptories allotted to a party guilty
of discrimination,
grant the opponent additional
peremptories, or in a particularly heinous case, award sanctions against the party deliberately violating Batson's directives.
Undoubtedly, one can marshall additional differences
between civil and criminal cases. Nevertheless, analysis of the
effects on ABF of the primary differences cited by courts and
commentators suggests several conclusions. First, the strongest justifications for treating civil and criminal cases differently rely on the greater rights of the criminal defendant.
Under Holland, however, the defendant may invoke the
protections of Batson even if she does not have any interest
affected by the alleged discrimination. The accused's greater
interests, therefore, cannot distinguish civil from criminal
cases. Second, the primary harm to juror and community
interests results from the perception, not the fact, of discrimination. The public's and jurors' perceptions, however, are
often indistinguishable in civil and criminal trials. Third,
although some criminal cases are likely to have a greater ABF

222. See J.

VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 286-88.
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than many civil cases, there are many criminal cases where
Batson is applicable that probably do not have a higher ABF
than the majority of civil cases. Moreover, most of the factors that might create a greater ABF in criminal cases are
easily identified and more accurately predict ABF than the
overbroad criminal/civil dichotomy. For example, whether
the party alleging a Batson violation is a member of the same
minority group as the excluded juror, whether unanimous
verdicts are required, and the number of challenges allotted
each party potentially affects ABF. Each factor, however, is
easily identified and cannot be predicted from the categorization of a case as criminal or civil. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, none of the differences between civil and criminal trials appears to affect the coefficient "x". In either type
of proceeding, the judicial system has a strong interest in
avoiding even the appearance of racism. In civil, no less than
criminal cases, judicial acquiescence in discriminatory peremptory challenges places a particularly pernicious imprimatur to race-based decision-making and potentially undermines
the integrity of, and public confidence in, our system of
justice. This alone, absent proof of some significant difference in ABF, probably justifies application of Batson to civil
trials. No significant differences are apparent. Quite simply,
the differences between civil and criminal trials do not justify
application of Batson to criminal, but not civil, proceedings.
V.

LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES

In Part Four, this article demonstrated that a civil
litigant's discriminatory peremptory challenge should be
deemed state action and that there is no principled reason to
reject the extension of Batson to civil trials. Batson, however,
is no panacea. Enforcement difficulties and administrative
costs make Batson a less than ideal solution to the problems
of discrimination in the jury selection process.2
In the criminal context, several commentators have suggested that Batson does not go far enough and recommend
the elimination of all peremptory challenges.22 4 This section

223. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 8, at 202-11; Gurney, supra, note 21;
Massaro, supra note 12, at 504; Note; Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right
Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines
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investigates the merits of that alternative for civil cases.
Again, the Batson function variables help to focus the analysis. Unfortunately, the answers do not seem as clear as in the
preceeding section. Eliminating all peremptories would create
greater harm from partiality, but would result in less harm
from discrimination and adminstrative costs than under
Batson. Which interests predominate may depend on the
reader's predispositions. This article offers several compromise positions and endorses legislation reducing the number
of peremptory challenges in civil cases to one per side. 2 5
Eliminating all peremptory challenges would reduce both
actual and perceived discrimination from the level existing
under Batson. Although one cannot underestimate the symbolic importance of a judicial rule prohibiting discrimination,2 26 the tangible effects of Batson are not as impressive. Batson does not eliminate much of the discrimination in the jury selection process. In many jurisdictions, it is
difficult to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If a
party establishes a prima facie case, the opposing party can
too easily rebut that showing by manufacturing race-neutral
reasons for the questioned peremptories.2 2 7 As recognized
by Justice Marshall, "outright prevarication" is not the only
danger. 228 An attorney's own conscious or unconscious racism may cause her honestly to believe that a prospective
minority juror is "sullen" or "uninterested," a characterization
that might not have come to mind if a non-minority juror
acted identically. 22 9 A judge's own conscious or unconscious
racism may lead her to accept such an explanation as well
supported. 2 " A judge's simple reverence for the historic

of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1026, 1026 (1987); see also Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
225. The one peremptory proposal is limited to civil trials. The criminal justice
system's interest in protecting the special rights of the accused may justify a
greater number of peremptory challenges for the criminal defendant See supra
note 190. The number of challenges allowed the prosecutor correspondingly might
be maintained to preserve the current adversarial balance. See Pizzi, supra note 20,
at 147.
226. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
228. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
229. Counsel also is able to rebut the prima facie case when race contributes
to, but is not the sole motivation for, the decision to strike a minority juror.

230. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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23
peremptory challenge right may produce the same result. '
Abolishing peremptory challenges would eliminate the unproven or unprovable discrimination that exists under Batson.
Also eliminated would be the community disrespect engendered by the declaration of a fundamental right that the
judiciary is helpless to enforce fully.' 22 Abandoning the
right to exclude jurors arbitrarily would even more dramatically reduce the harm from perceived discrimination. Under
Batson, juror and community injury results not only when
proof problems or unconscious racism leads to erroneous
rulings, but also when a party establishes a prima facie case
that is rebutted outside the presence of the jury. The prima
facie case creates the perception of discrimination and the
jurors and community never learn the race-neutral reasons
for the minority members' exclusion. In such cases, the harm
from perceived discrimination is just as great as when the
party exercises her peremptory challenges with the most
invidious motives. Such injury would not exist under a system which permitted only challenges for cause. Perhaps most
important, eliminating peremptory challenges would reduce
reliance on group stereotypes of all kinds. Such broad-based
generalizations primarily foster discrimination and demean
human beings. They should be discouraged in all segments
of society, much less in the judicial system.
Eliminating all peremptory challenges should greatly
decrease administrative costs. First and foremost, it would
eliminate the need for Batson hearings. Although the Court
in Batson declared "[n]or are we persuaded by the State's
suggestion that our holding will create serious administrative
difficulties, " "' judges and commentators have not been as
sanguine about the burden created by Batson.3 Batson may

231. A judge's racist attitudes or reverance for the historic peremptory challenge right also may contribute to a party's threshold inability to prove a prima
facie case of discrimination.
232. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 286-87, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 909-10 (1978).
233. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 99.
234. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121, 1127 (8th Cir. 1989)
(Beam, J., dissenting); Schreiber v. Salamack, 619 F. Supp. 1433, 1440 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), afYd, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), ceil. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1311 (1989)
(pre-Batson case discussing application of similar test); Alschuler, supra note 8, at
199; Pizzi, supra note 20, at 140-142. As Professor Pizzi notes, the Batson court's
reliance on the lack of any evidence of serious administrative burdens in states
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not require full evidentiary hearings, but the numerous motions and appeals Batson engenders are hardly cost-free. The
number of hearings only should increase if lower courts,
following Holland, no longer require the complaining party
to be a minority group member or the same race as the
excluded juror." 5 Second, without Batson hearings, there
would be no need for a Batson remedy. In particular, there
would be fewer new trials and no need to empanel new juries. A third minor benefit of the proposal to eliminate all
peremptories would be to reduce slightly the expense of
assembling the jury pool. The government would not require
as many jurors to serve each day. That may have the additional peripheral advantage of eliminating the frustration
many citizens feel when they are summoned to jury service,
forced to wait for several hours and then dismissed by counsel for no apparent reason. Arguably, the proposal might
increase the duration and cost of voir dire. Stripped of several of their peremptory challenges, counsel might feel a greater need to question prospective jurors to establish challenges
for cause. The proposal, however, may offer offsetting voir
dire procedure benefits. Under Batson, counsel are encouraged to question jurors to establish race-neutral reasons for
the discriminatory exclusion of minority members. That charade could be eliminated. Additionally, without the availability of peremptory challenges to remove jurors who have
been offended by counsel's questions, counsel may choose to
restrict their voir dire questioning. In any event, whatever
incentives counsel may feel, the court has the ultimate power
to control voir dire. Thus, eliminating all peremptories in
civil trials need not have any negative effect on the duration
or cost of voir dire. The proposal, however, probably would
increase the costs of litigating challenges for cause. In many
jurisdictions, rulings on challenges for cause are not reviewable if the objecting party can peremptorily challenge the

that previously adopted Batson-like procedures may have been misplaced. The
Court cited People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1983), as support for its position. In Hall, however, the California Supreme Court
stated only that "the People have not produced, or called to our attention, any
empirical evidence in support of their criticism of Wheeler." People v. Hall, 672
P.2d at 859. The Court did not affirmatively find that administration of Wheeler [a
state constitution variant of Batson] was simple or cost-effective.
235. See supra note 85.
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questioned juror."3 6 Eliminating peremptory challenges,
therefore, will create additional appeals of disputed for cause
rulings and result in extra reversals and new trials. Finally,
eliminating peremptory challenges might raise administrative
costs by increasing the number of hung juries as more diverse jurors are permitted to remain on the petit juries.'"
This, however, may be 'an illegitimate concern. Hung juries
do not represent system failures. They are a "treasured part"
of the legal system's respect for minority viewpoints."' If
juror agreement, rather than justice, was the goal, there
would be no attempt to maintain a fair cross section of the
community on the jury.
Against the benefits of reduced discrimination and administrative costs must be weighed the harm from increased
partiality that would result from elimination of the peremptory challenge right. Peremptory challenges can reduce jury
partiality by removing jurors who should have been, but were
not, excused for cause. Extremely prejudiced jurors may not
be dismissed for cause either because the judge makes an
error or because the juror is unaware of or successfully hides
her prejudices.!39 The peremptory challenge also reduces
the harm from partiality by excluding jurors who, although
not so prejudiced as to justify a challenge for cause, are at
the extremes of permissible bias. All jurors are not equal.
Everyone comes to the jury room with some predispositions.
These predispositions may be viewed as within a normal
distribution range, beyond which a challenge for cause is
justified. With a normal spin of the jury wheel, the permissible prejudices should be minor and offsetting. Occasionally,
however, the spin of the wheel may produce a skewed jury
or a jury with at least one member at the extreme of permissible bias. The peremptory challenge permits the litigant to
eliminate these "aberrational" jurors. 4 ' The peremptory

236. See Jurywork, supra note 8, at 10-32, section 10.0214]; cf. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (upholding state requirement that litigant exercise
peremptory challenges to cure erroneous refusals to excuse jurors for cause).
237. See Pizzi, supra note 20, at 145.

238. See Gurney, supra note 21, at 256.
239. Jurors often are reluctant to admit racist attitudes to themselves, much
less to strangers in open court.
240. For example, assume a jury's spectrum of biases could be illustrated by
the following continuum:
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challenge also is said to protect the litigant by permitting
intense voir dire questioning without fear of antagonizing
jurors for whom cause cannot be shown. 4 ' Jurors who react hostilely to counsel's questions may be removed peremptorily. Finally, the peremptory challenge allows the litigant to
deselect jurors with whom the litigant, for whatever reason,
does not feel comfortable.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to believe that the
harm from partiality under 'a system without peremptory
challenges may not be as serious as first appears. First, there
is empirical evidence that attorneys frequently cannot success242
fully identify juror bias with their peremptory challenges.
Thus, peremptory challenges do not necessarily reduce actual
juror partiality. 24 3 Second, in most cases, attorneys do not
identify specific bias. Rather, they rely on indicia such as
race, religion, national origin, and occupation to isolate juror
bias.2 44 Those are precisely the generalizations that the judicial system should discourage. Subtle manifestations of juror
bias often only reflect counsel's own prejudices. Third, although eliminating peremptory challenges leaves the litigant
at the mercy of the spin of the jury wheel, litigants are
equally subject to the vagaries of chance in judge-tried cas-

Ix
cause

* * * ***I*** ** *1
neutral

cause

The peremptory challenge furthers neutrality by permitting the litigant to
eliminate juror X.
241. See Babcock, supra note 9, at 554-55.
242. See Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Ver"
dict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978); see also
Gurney, supra note 21, at 250-52; Note, The Use of Peirmptoty Challenges to Exclude
Blacks from Petit Juries in Civil Actions: The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, 4
REV. LITIG. 175, 213 & n.182 (1984). The Zeisel and Diamond study concluded
that not only was attorney performance on voir dire erratic, but when one side
performed well and the other did not, the disparity may have distorted justice.
Zeisel & Diamond, supra, at 518-19. This, however, may be more a problem with
the adversary system than with the peremptory challenge process. Trials are often
a battle of attorneys with victory determined by counsel's competence, rather than
a search for the truth with the facts and law dispositive.
243. Modern scientific juror evaluation methods may enhance attorneys' performance during voir dire, see McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social
Science in Trials with Political and Racial Oveutones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 226 (Winter 1977), but they also exascerbate the degree
to which peremptory challenges discriminate against the poor who cannot afford
jury experts or community sampling techniques. In any event, sophisticated juror
selection procedures remain the exception rather than the rule.
244. See Note, supra note 242, 4 REV. LITIG. at 179 n.23.
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es.245 Judges often differ in their private prejudices and p6litical philosophies. 4 ' Additionally, the unfairness perceived
from random selection cannot compare to the impression of
unfairness created by systematic discrimination. There is also
a question whether it is desirable to remove the "aberrational" juror from the jury. Unless subject to exclusion for cause,
the "aberrational" juror may be considered a valued ingredient of the cross-sectional jury. 247 Fourth, the peremptory is
not necessary to protect intense voir dire. Persistent
questioning, rather than antagonizing jurors, often indoctrinates them to counsel's view of the case and sensitizes the
jurors to their own prejudices.2 4 A juror questioned about
her bias even may favor the party doubting her integrity,
rather than confront the possibility that she is prejudiced.
There is also little evidence that counsel can successfully
identify those few jurors who are antagonized by the invasion
of their privacy.2 49 In any event, counsel rarely has the opportunity for extensive questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire. Judges control voir dire and frequently are the
only questioners during the process. Eliminating the peremptory challenge right, therefore, should not affect
counsel's conduct during voir dire. Fifth, a greater judicial
willingness to grant challenges for cause2 50 and appeals of
erroneous decisions can partially substitute for the elimination of peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges would
no longer be needed to remove the most biased jurors. Similarly, more intensive voir dire may more accurately identify
juror bias. The resultant number of additional successful
challenges for cause even may exceed the number of peremptory challenges now allocated to each litigant.2"'

245. Even in jury cases, the identity of the judge can influence the outcome of
litigation. The judge may supervise settlement negotiations, rules on all motions
and can consciously or unconsciously sway the jury.
246. One might argue that judges are more capable of insulating their decisions from their private biases than are lay jurors. The ease with which one can
categorize many judges as conservative or liberal, however, suggests that this
argument is more theoretical than real.
247. See Gurney, supra note 21, at 247-49.
248. Id. at 253-54.
249. See supra note 242.
250. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
251. In a study of voir dire in capital cases, Nietzel & Dillehay found that
when judges and jurors questioned propsective jurors en masse, the court granted
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There is no escaping, however, that elimination of peremptory challenges will increase partiality if, as under current
practice, judges are reluctant to exclude jurors for cause. It is
extremely difficult to convince a judge to strike a juror for
cause.2 512 Many courts will refuse to grant a "cause" challenge whenever the juror says that she would decide the case
"only on the evidence presented."2 53 Jurors, quite naturally,
are generally willing to make such a declaration, rather than
admit to being prejudiced and close-minded. Thus, the true
value of the peremptory challenge may be to eliminate extremely biased jurors while protecting citizens from the humility of accusations of racism and judges from the embar2 54
rassment of rejecting jurors' protestations of impartiality.
The peremptory challenge also saves the costs associated with
its likely substitute-more extensive voir dire and litigation
over challenges for cause.255
Do these benefits outweigh the potential harms from
peremptory challenges? Eliminating all peremptory challenges, even in cases that don't involve racial issues and in
which there is no reason to expect juror discrimination,
seems overbroad. On the other hand, preserving the peremptory challenge as a face-saving device for cases close to or
over the line of appropriate exclusion for cause permits irrational and sometimes invidious discrimination in countless
cases far from the line.256 The appropriate balance is not
obvious. Resolution of this conundrum depends on one's
values and views about the judicial process. Specifically, the
balance will vary with one's perspectives concerning the
weight to be given variables "x," "y," and "z" in the Batson
function,2 57 the success of Batson in eliminating discrimina-

an average of 2.8 defense challenges for cause. Nietzel & Dillehay, The Effects of
Variations in Voir Dire Procedures in Capital Murder Trials, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
1, 8 (1982). When jurors were questioned individually outside the presence of the
other prosepective jurors,. the judge granted the defense an average of twenty
challenges for cause. Id.
252. See Pizzi, supra note 20, at 146.
253. See Babcock, supra note 9, 549-50; see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 423 (1985).
254. See Alsehuler, supra note 8, at 206.
255. More extensive voir dire not only is costly and time consuming, but also
seriously may invade juror privacy. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 8, at 361.
256. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 208.
257. It is tempting to suggest that variable "z" must be given de minimis
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tion and the ability of the Court to foster more rigorous enforcement of Batson, the ability of counsel to identify hidden
bias through hunches or physical observation, the prevalence
of disagreements between counsel and judges on for cause
rulings and the practicality of reducing those disagreements
through greater voir dire or more searching judicial scrutiny
of challenges for cause. Obviously, judges and commentators
may reasonably disagree about each of these issues.
One possible compromise proposal would invalidate
peremptory challenges if, but only if, a litigant established a
prima facie case of discrimination. 28 This proposal effectively adopts Batson, but does not give opposing counsel the
right to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. This
alternative would reduce much of the harm from discrimination that Batson does not successfully remedy. No longer
would "the jurors don't look attentive" be an acceptable explanation for a series of seemingly race-based peremptory
challenges. Moreover, as suggested previously, much of the
harm from discrimination results from juror and community
perceptions of discrimination. The prima facie case, at least
if rebuttal reasons are heard outside the presence of the
jury, determines those perceptions. The harm from partiality,
however, would be greater than under Batson. Some litigants,
even if not guilty of actual discrimination, would be precluded from removing jurors whom the judge erroneously determined could not be excluded for cause. Similarly, the litigant
could not remove minority members whose hidden bias was
revealed through physical observation, e.g., the juror who,
through gritted teeth and with a scowl, unconvincingly denied bias. Additionally, jurors who perceived counsel's peremptory challenge as discriminatory are likely to harbor
resentment. Restoring them to the jury would seem to unfair-

weight relative to the other variables. A concern over administrative costs should
pale in comparison to society's interests in eliminating discrimination and maintaining confidence in the fairness of the jury process. Nevertheless, courts consider
administrative costs a significant interest. If they didn't, all courts would engage in
extensive voir dire to isolate juror bias more accurately. The prevalence of less
than twelve person juries also illustrates the prominence of administrative costs in
many jurisdictions' balance.
258. This proposal would require legislation. The peremptory challenge statute
is face-neutral and a prima facie case alone does not establish purposeful discrimination. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
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ly prejudice a litigant who had race-neutral reasons for the
peremptory challenge. 259 The degree of increase in the
harm from partiality, however, should be less than the increase accompanying the complete elimination of peremptory
challenges. The proposal does not interfere with the peremptory challenge right unless the challenge threatens harm from
discrimination. Challenges to non-suspect class jurors would
always be permitted. In effect, this proposal reduces the overbreadth from which the no peremptory challenge recommendation suffers, but introduces a new form of partiality (the
resentful juror) and increases administrative costs (hearings
to establish a prima facie case).
A variation of the above proposal would permit the opposing party to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination,
but only by proving "cause" for the challenge, albeit under a
standard more lenient than existing law. Objectively verifiable
proof of specific bias could justify the challenge and the
court would not give dispositive weight to juror declarations
that the juror could decide the case only on the evidence
presented. "The juror was inattentive," however, still would
be insufficient to rebut the prima facie case. In effect, this
variation adopts Batson, but demands that courts more
closely police counsels' rebuttal explanations. Compared to
complete elimination of the right to rebut a prima facie case,
this variation would reduce the harm from partiality, but
would probably also increase the harm from discrimination
and administrative costs. Jurors who were unaware of the
justifications for the facially discriminatory challenges would
suffer stigma and the community respect for the judicial
system similarly would be reduced. Erroneous findings of
"psuedo-cause" also could leave actual discrimination
unremedied. Finally, there would be no guarantee that courts
would scrutinize counsels' rebuttal reasons with the desired
26 0
rigor.
Nevertheless, compared to Batson procedures alone, this
variation should eliminate additional discrimination without

259. Beginning the selection process anew, however, would encourage discriminatory strikes when there was an unusually large number of jurors on the
panel and would further increase administrative costs.
260. The demand for objectively verifiable proof of specific bias, however,
would at least permit greater appellate review of lackadaisical lower court analysis.
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significantly increasing the harm from partiality or administrative costs. Harm from discrimination would decrease because it would be more difficult for counsel to manufacture
neutral reasons for facially discriminatory challenges. Partiality would increase to the extent the litigant would be precluded from striking jurors based on hunches, stereotypes, or
physical observations. These bases for peremptory challenges,
however, are the least reliable and most subject to abuse.
Unless one has an unshakeable faith in the ability of attorneys to identify hidden bias, restricting such challenges
should, at least in most cases, sacrifice little. Thus, this variation would seem to be an almost guaranteed improvement
on Batson.
Perhaps the best, and most administrable, balance might
be reached by legislation reducing the number of peremptory
challenges allotted each side to one.26' This recommendation may minimize the Batson function if, as is assumed,
peremptory challenges provide benefits and harms
logarithmically, not linearly. That is, the marginal damage
from each peremptory challenge is not identical. The first
peremptory challenge does not create one-third the harm
from discrimination that three peremptory challenges provide. With only one challenge, in only the rarest case will
jurors and the community perceive any discrimination when
a minority juror is excused. The excluded juror would have
no reason to feel stigmatized and the community should not
lose respect for the judicial system. 62 The same is not true
when there has been a series of exclusions of minority members. 3 Similarly, each peremptory challenge does not af-

261. A variation of this proposal would grant the judge the discretion to
increase the number of peremptory challenges per side in cases where juror
prejudice appears to be a particularly strong risk. This article rejects this variation.
The same function could be accomplished through liberalized "for cause" rulings.
Permitting judges to increase the number of peremptories in cases where prejudice is more likely seems to sanction judicial reliance on group-based stereotypes
and would increase litigation costs.
262. Although the one peremptory proposal would permit each party to exercise one discriminatory challenge, the reality of practice under BaLson is little
different. One discriminatory challenge generally will not support a prima facie

case of discrimination under Batson. But see People v. Bryant, 159 A.2d 962, 552
N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). Rarer still is the case in which counsel
cannot rebut a prima facie case that is based on a single questioned challenge.
263. When more than one juror is excluded, the only factor in common
between or among the jurors may be their minority status. This might raise an
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fect the harm from partiality proportionally. The first challenge should achieve a disproportionate amount of the benefits provided by the peremptory challenge. The first challenge
eliminates the juror viewed as most partial. 6 4 If there is a
normal distribution, there may not even be more than one
juror, on the panel that significantly deviates from the norm.
Additionally, appellate review of "cause" rulings is not permitted in many jurisdictions if the challenged juror could
have been removed peremptorily. Therefore, unless the frequency of judicial error on challenges for cause is great, the
first peremptory also should protect against the greatest
number of appeals. Thus, additional peremptories will have
increasingly diminishing benefits, both in terms of eliminating partiality and reducing appeals of "for cause" rulings.
Finally, because one peremptory challenge should not raise
an inference of discrimination, the one peremptory proposal
would avoid the costs associated with Batson hearings.
Hence, compared to a peremptory challenge system with
three or more peremptories, limited by Batson, the one peremptory proposal should decrease discrimination. Minority
members' equal protection rights would not be held hostage
to the judiciary's inability or unwillingness to police counsels'
peremptory challenges. Not only would the proposal reduce
the unproven or unprovable discrimination existing under
Batson, it would also eliminate most of the harm from perceived discrimination that results when prima facie cases are
rebutted outside the presence of the jury. 65 The harm
from partiality would increase, but only marginally. The one
challenge protects against most of the potential harm from
partiality. Elimination of Batson hearings should vastly decrease administrative costs. Compared to complete elimination of peremptory challenges, the one peremptory proposal
should only marginally increase actual (but not perceived)
discrimination. Relatively little damage can be done with just

inference of purposeful discrimination. Absent unusual circumstances, e.g., exclusion of the lone black juror without questioning, the same inference should not
be permissible when only one juror is excluded.
264. To guarantee that the litigant may challenge the juror viewed as most
partial, the one peremptory proposal should be enacted as part of a struck jury
system. See supr= note 12. Otherwise, a party may exercise their peremptory challenge before the most aberrational juror enters the jury box.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
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one peremptory. The harm from partiality would be significantly reduced. Administration costs, in many jurisdictions,
would also decrease because litigants would need to appeal
fewer questionable for cause rulings. 8 6
It is impossible to perfectly accommodate two
irreconcilable interests. Some will argue that equal protection
interests mandate the complete elimination of the peremptory challenge. Others will insist that the peremptory challenge
right should remain unfettered. Many will prefer a compromise proposal. This article recommends reducing the number
of peremptory challenges per side to one. The recommendation, however, is less important than the methodology. Analysis through use of the Batson function at least reveals the
costs inherent in each suggested balance and encourages
reasoned decision-making.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is no disagreement that discrimination pervades
the jury process in many civil courthouses. Courts and commentators only disagree about how best to eradicate such
discrimination. Batson may not be a perfect cure. Legislation
reducing the number of peremptory challenges allotted each
litigant may more efficiently eliminate juror discrimination.
Reasonable minds may differ. One even might disagree with
the wisdom of Batson itself. A critic may find that the inability fully to enforce and the costs attendant to Batson outweigh
the tangible benefits achieved and the important symbolic
message conveyed by Batson. What there should be no question about, however, is that there is no principled way to
distinguish Batson's application in criminal from civil trials.
None of the differences between criminal and civil proceedings significantly impacts the critical interests identified by
Batson and Holland. The fourteenth amendment's state action
requirement also presents no basis for rejecting application
of Batson to civil trials. Case law can support and consideration of state action policies dictates that a private litigant's
discriminatory peremptory challenge be deemed state action.
Thus, until Batson or the dicta in Holland are overruled, or
Congress or the states enact legislation modifying the per-

266. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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emptory challenge right, courts should require judicial review
of alleged discriminatory peremptory challenges in all civil
trials.

